NA by Carlson, Mark J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1998-12
SOF planning for uncertainty : creative thinking in
dynamic environments
Carlson, Mark J.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/32614
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 
THESIS 
SOF PLANNING FOR UNCERTAINTY: CREATIVE 




Mark J. Carlson 
December 1998 
Erik Jansen 
Gordon H. McConnick 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
Preceding PageS Blank 
19990219082 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE FOfT1l Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
December 1998 Master's Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
SOF PLANNING FOR UNCERTAINTY: CREATIVE THINKING IN DYNAMIC 
ENVIRONMENTS 
6. AUTHOR(S) 
Carlson, Mark J. 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT Naval Postgraduate School NUMBER 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
9. SPONSORING I MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING I 
MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of 
Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION I AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the question of why special operation missions succeed or fail. The author argues that 
success or failure is directly related to the problem of planning for uncertainty. Special operations are executed in an inherently 
dynamic enviroment. This environment creates uncertainty for both planners and operators. The most successful planners account 
for uncertainty in the planning process - before the operators ever conduct an operation. 
This thesis builds a model for exploring this phenomenon. The purpose of the model is to provide the reader with a conceptual 
tool for understanding the problems and process of planning in uncertainty (the art and the science). Specifically it defines three 
essential tools for planning in uncertainty - adaptive learning, shaping, and hedging. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF 
Uncertainty, Complexity, Predictability, Adaptive Learning, Shaping, Hedging PAGES 
11) 
16. PRICE CODE 
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF 19. SECURITY CLASSIFI· CATION 20. LIMITATION 





. OF ABSTRACT 
UL 
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239·18 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 




Mark J. Carlson 
Major, United States Anny 
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1987 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 1998 
Maurice D. Weir, Chairman 
Special Operations Curriculum Committee 
iii 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the question of why special operation 
missions succeed or fail. The author argues that success or failure is directly related to the 
I 
problem of planning for uncertainty. Special operations are executed in an inherently 
dynamic environment. This environment creates uncertainty for both planners and 
operators. The most successful planners account for uncertainty in the planning process 
- before the operators ever conduct an operation. . 
This thesis builds a model for exploring this phenomenon. The purpose of the 
model is to provide the reader with a conceptual tool for understanding the problems and 
process of planning in uncertainty (the art and the science). Specifically it identifies three 
essential tools for planning in uncertainty - adaptive learning, shaping and hedging. 
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... the business of special operations is a dangerous desperate one. Nations 
summon their best and brightest to perfonn missions that are so daring and 
spectacular that many are beyond the scope of imagination. Yet the daring 
and the spectacular comes with risk - and it comes with loss 
(Katz, 1998, p.l 0). 
A. PURPOSE 
There has always been a certain fascination surrounding the deeds and feats of 
special operation forces. The idea of a small band of bold and daring soldiers 
overcoming great odds to defeat a larger foe is very appealing both to the general public 
and to those in power that are capable of invoking their use to solve a nasty problem. 
Unfortunately as Samuel Katz notes above there are inherent risks associated with these 
types of operations. History tells us that the outcome of using special operation forces 
(SOF) has been mixed. There have been incredible successes, including the Gennan raid 
on the Belgian fortress at Eben Emael, the Israeli raid on Entebbe, and the British fetid on 
the Iranian embassy in London. There also have been some dramatic failures, including 
the British raid on Tobruk, the U.S. hostage rescue attempt in Iran, and the Israeli raid in 
Ansariya, Lebanon. This paper explores why strategic direct action special operations 
succeed or fail. 
There are a number of current theories concerning why and how special 
operations succeed or fail. Lucien Vandenbrouke and William McRaven each advanced 
recent theories that discuss this phenomenon (McRaven, 1995; Vandenbrouke, 1993). 
Vandenbrouke addresses the question from a strategic frame of reference and McRaven 
from a tactical frame of reference. Though both advance distinctly different theories of 
special operations, they both emphasize planning as a key variable in the . success or 
failure of these missions. As McRaven points out, "A simple plan, carefully concealed, 
repeatedly and realistically rehearsed, and executed with surprise, speed and purpose" 
will minimize the potential failure of an operation (McRaven, 1995, p.II). He further 
states that "the key is to develop a plan that makes the enemy's defenses ineffective and 
guarantees an advantage before one reaches the point of vulnerability" (McRaven, 1995, 
p.84). Vandenbrouke notes in his analysis how difficult this often is for planners to 
achieve: "Planners have a personal stake in their plan. No matter how hard they try to 
stay objective, even first-rate planners are liable to overlook deficiencies in their product" 
(Vandenbrouke, 1993, p.161).The author agrees with both statements. Effective 
planning lays the foundation upon which successful special operations are conducted. 
Unfortunately it is often difficult to achieve a masterful plan. It is my premise that 
special operations tend to fail more frequently because of faulty or poor planning than 
they do because of faulty or poor execution. Later chapters of this thesis will argue that 
special operation can often succeed remarkably well despite numerous mistakes in the 
execution phase. Consider the following two case studies. 
1. Eben Emael 
On May 10, 1940 German commandos conducted a highly successful raid on the 
Belgian fortress at Eben Emael. The fort served as a critical link in a chain of Belgian 
forts along the border with Germany. The Belgians considered the fort to be 
impregnable. This assumption proved to be incorrect. In a pre-dawn insertion, "Assault 
Detachment Koch", consisting of 78 commandos in 41 gliders descended out of the 
darkness onto the fortress complex. The German commandos succeeded in capturing the 
fort and forcing the surrender of its occupants: over 700 Belgian soldiers (Mrazek, 1970; 
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Bekker, 1996). While the operation was clearly a stunning victory for the special 
operations world, the mission was not without it's glaring problems. 
First, the Belgians suspected the Germans were planning such an attack on the 
fortress complex. Over the course of several months prior to the actual assault, Belgian 
defense forces practiced a series of drills and alerts to prepare for an assault on the 
fortress. Therefore, from the start, the Germans lacked strategic surprise. Second, in the 
darkness and confusion, the JU 52s (the tow planes for the gliders) released several of the 
gliders too soon. They did not land anywhere near their intended targets. One of these 
errant gliders carried the leader and his team who were responsible for commanding and 
controlling the assault on the fortress. They missed the initial assault on the fortress 
entirely. Third, the Germans lost tactical surprise when some of the gliders (still in tow) 
missed their intended release point. The Belgian defenses heard the drone of the JU 52s 
overhead and began firing at the raiding forces while they were still in the approach phase 
(Bekker, 1996). The Belgians at the fort also had time to alert their higher headquarters 
as well as a Belgian reaction force in the nearby town. Finally, the conventional forces 
that were supposed to relieve the commandos were delayed. The outnumbered (over 700 
Belgian troops) and outgunned commandos spent nearly 28 hours on the objective before 
they were relieved by conventional troops (Mrazek, 1970). Thus despite the loss of 
strategic and tactical surprise, speed, and key leadership, the operation succeeded 
brilliantly. The German commandos accomplished all of their intended objectives. They 
destroyed or neutralized all of the fort's critical guns and secured the three bridges that 




On September 13, 1942, British forces in North Africa conducted a raid on a key 
Gennan installation at the port city of Tobruk. The goal was to seize the city of Tobruk 
for a brief period of time from the Gennan and Italian defenders (Carell, 1996; Gordon, 
1987; Owen, 1981). In a synchronized attack the raiders with support from conventional 
troops would systematically destroy the ports key facilities to include fuel supplies, 
communication nodes and radar equipment. In the end the raid was a disastrous failure. 
The plan was as follows. Colonel Haselden and 90 members of the elite Long 
Range Desert Group would drive three trucks over 1500 miles to the objective and 
infiltrate the fortified city disguised as a convoy transporting British prisoners of war 
(POWs). The raiders would paint and configure the trucks to resemble typical Gennan 
Afrika Corps vehicles. The Gennan "guards" that would escort the British "POWs" 
were actually members of a Special Interrogation Unit (SIG). The members of SIG were 
Gennan Jews that worked directly for the British in North Africa (Gordon, 1987). 
Under the confusion and cover of a coordinated air-attack the raiders would seize 
a bridgehead south of the harbor where the Ital~ans and Gennans had set up a series of 
coastal artillery and air defense artillery sites to protect the port. Once the raiders had 
secured these key sites they would initiate a preplanned signal and guide an amphibious 
landing force of approximately 650 Marines to their beach landing sites inside the harbor. 
The Marines would launch patrol boats from British destroyers out at sea. Once the 
assault force and Marines had destroyed all the important installations at T obruk, they 
would all depart the target area via amphibious launches and link back up with the British 
destroyers (Carell, 1996; Gordon, 1987). 
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A second assault force, under the command of Captain Lloyd Owen, was tasked 
with further isolating the objective. Their mission was to infiltrate the city during the air 
raid. Once inside the perimeter they would capture the radio and radar stations, seal off 
the entrance road to the port, and sever all outside communications links (Carell, 1996; 
Owen, 1981). 
Initially the operation went extremely well. The raiders took the Germans and 
Italian defenders completely by surprise with their clever ruse. They successfully 
infiltrated the city as planned, and under the coordinated air attack began systematically 
seizing the coastal defense sites south of the harbor. Thanks to excellent intelligence 
work the raiders had highly detailed and accurate photos and maps of the key defense 
sites (Carell, 1996; Gordon, 1987). 
Unfortunately the mission began to slowly fall apart after this point. First, the 
Italian and German defenders put up stiffer resistance then the raiders had originally 
anticipated. There is strong evidence to suggest that the Germans suspected that the 
Allies might mount an assault on Tobruk (Gordon, 1987). Unknown to the assault group 
and to British intelligence at the time was that Tobruk had a first-rate German infantry 
reaction force at their disposal for just such emergencies. The Germans launched an 
immediate counterattack against the raiders (Gordon, 1987). Several elements of the 
raiding force had considerable difficulty in capturing their assigned objectives against the 
determined and skilled German defenders. As a result the signal· to launch the 
amphibious assault was delayed for over an hour. 
Second, the raider elements that were supposed to guide the amphibious craft to 
the harbor lost their searchlights. Thus, instead of lighting the east and west sides of the 
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secured landing sites as planned, only the eastern side of the bay was lit up. The 
amphibious crafts became hopelessly confused as to when and where they were supposed 
to land. Only two of the 18 landing craft found the intended site. Many of the landing 
craft simply circled around in the harbor for hours. 
Third, Captain Owen's supporting force never received the preplanned code word 
(to be sent by Colonel Haselden) to seize their targets (Carell, 1996; Owen, 1981). When 
the amphibious force did not land at their scheduled hour, Captain Owens aborted his 
mission and ex filtrated his team back to friendly lines. Thus the enemy radio and radar 
stations were never destroyed and the objective never was sufficiently isolated. 
These crucial mistakes allowed the initially surprised Germans and Italian 
defenders critical time to reconsolidate their defenses. The Germans succeeded in 
recapturing the guns that defended the harbor and began focusing their attentions on the 
British naval threat that could be clearly observed from the shore batteries. As a result, 
the British destroyers came under deadly fire from the coastal batteries in the waning 
hours of the assault. The British naval forces had no choice but to depart the area in order 
to prevent an even bigger catastrophe from occurring. In the end the British lost both 
their destroyers and numerous small craft to Axis aircraft and coastal guns. 
The hapless Long Range Desert Group on the ground was effectively cut off from 
all further conventional support. The overwhelmed, exhausted and outnumbered raiders 
were eventually killed or forced to surrender. The British suffered devastating losses. In 
all, three British warships were sunk, eight British and American bombers crews were 




A cursory comparison of these two case studies illustrates the similarities of both 
operations. First, in both of the above case studies the raiders were well trained, highly 
motivated, and ably led. Second, both the German and British raiders had ample time to 
plan, prepare and execute the mission. Third, both had ample support from conventional 
forces. Fourth, in both cases the raiders lost strategic and tactical surprise and suffered 
from intelligence and command and control lapses (Gordon, 1987; Mrazek, 1970). 
The two case studies also highlight some important differences. The Germans 
that conducted the operation on Eben Emael were average soldiers that were specially 
trained for their mission (McRaven, 1995). The British that conducted the raid on Tobruk 
were members of the elite Long Range Desert Group; they were already specially trained, 
organized and equipped to conduct acts of sabotage, raids . and surveillance 
reconnaissance behind enemy lines (Carell, 1996; Gordon, 1987). The Germans 
succeeded despite the loss of strategic and tactical surprise, speed, and key leadership 
while the British failed despite virtually the same conditions. How can this be explained? 
The author argues that the answer lies in the planning process. It is exceedingly 
more difficult for well-trained, highly motivated special operators to execute or overcome 
the difficulties of a poorly conceived plan than it is for average soldiers to execute a 
robust well-conceived plan. A "good" plan can offset major errors in the execution phase 
of an operation such as loss of surprise, speed or command and control. While I am not 
suggesting that effective planning is the only reason why these types of operations 
succeed, I do argue that it is one of the most critical factors that influence the outcome of 
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special operations and therefore deserves more focus and further study. Thus, effective 
planning is a necessary but not sufficient condition for success. 
Although the need for thorough, detailed planning is obviously critical for the 
success of special operations, designing such a plan is often problematic. My premise is 
that special operations are executed in an inherently dynamic environment filled with 
stochastic events. This environment creates uncertainty for both the planners and 
operators. The most successful planners recognize this fact and take the necessary steps to 
account for and reduce the effects of uncertainty in the planning process before the 
operators ever hit the ground. This thesis builds a model for looking at this phenomenon. 
The purpose of the model is to provide the reader with a conceptual tool for 
understanding the problems and process of planning in uncertainty. Specifically it 
identifies what I consider are the essential tools for planning in dynamic uncertain 
environments. 
B. PLANNING IN UNCERTAINTY 
Special operation units typically operate in dynamic environments. They are 
frequently called upon to execute short notice missions across a broad spectrum of 
conflict, in both peace and wartime environments (Shelton, 1996; Schoomaker, 1998). 
Their strategic utility is in their size, skill and combat power. They are small forces with 
large, destructive capabilities. Thus their actions and capabilities are disproportionate to 
their actual size. They can inflict short, sharp, precise blows against a larger unsuspecting 
enemy force (Arquilla, 1997). SOF are a strategic asset because they expand the available 
options to national leaders particularly in situations that lie in the gray areas between 
diplomacy and overt warfare between states. As General Schoomaker notes, "SOF allow 
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decisionmakers the flexibility to tailor responses, lethal and nonlethal, to encompass this 
wide range of possibilities and reduce the risk of escalation associated with larger, more 
visible force deployments" (Schoomaker, 1998, p. 2). 
While special operation forces have the advantage of low signature, superior 
training, leadership and motivation, their achilles heel is their "staying power". SOF are . 
particularly susceptible to a dynamic operational environment because of their small size 
and available firepower. They do not have the ability to sustain themselves and survive on 
the ground for long periods of time against a strong conventional force. If plans go 
wrong, these elite units are extremely vulnerable to annihilation (Gray, 1996). As Colin 
Gray notes, " as a general rule, special operations forces cannot 'call in the cavalry' to 
effect a timely rescue if plans go awry in action. If special operations forces themselves 
are unable to tie an emergency knot in a plan that comes apart, they likely face capture or 
death (or both)" (Gray, 1996, p. 147). A perfect example of this point is illustrated by the 
following case example. 
On 5 September 1997, Israeli special operators conducted a raid into southern 
Lebanon. The special operators were members of the navy's elite Flotilla 13. The raid 
was in retaliation for a series of terrorist bombings that had occurred in Jerusalem the 
week prior. Their intended mission was to land near the coastal town of Ansariya, 
;<;~ Lebanon and ambush a meeting of senior officials from the "Islamic Resistance" 
" 
movement. The purpose was to capture or kill these terrorist leaders (Katz, 1998). 
As the special operators were making their way across the western side of a road 
that led toward their intended objective, they came under a deadly ambush themselves 
from guerrillas lying in wait. Two Claymore mines ripped through the ranks of the small 
9 
patrol killing or wounding many of the operators instantly. For the next hour the 
surviving operators came under withering small arms fire from guerrillas and Lebanese 
army regulars who had joined the firefight. It took a rescue force of 150 men, with close 
air support nearly two hours to extracted the dead and wounded off the objective. In the 
end, 12 out of the 16-man patrol were killed in action. Israeli officials now call the failed 
raid on Ansiraya the single worst one-day combat losses in over a decade (Katz, 1998). 
As of this writing Israeli officials will not say if the operators simply stumbled 
into a roving ambush or whether the Islamic Resistance were tipped off to the Israeli 
operation through a breach of security. In either case post mortem investigations 
attributed the failure in part, to faulty planning. Critics of the failed raid charge that the 
planners had inadequate intelligence on the objective and did not accurately assess the 
abilities and skills of the Shiite guerrillas that the team might encounter (Katz, 1998, p.8). 
This uncertainty in tum was not taken into account in the operational plan. 
This incident as well as the other two case studies highlights the inherent risk 
associated with such operations. Variables that may affect the operation are 
interconnected in varying and often unknown degrees. The slightest change or ripple in 
one variable can have a dramatic effect on other variables and the outcome of the 
intended operation. Thus small errors in timing, planning, or judgment that may be 
insignificant to larger, conventional forces can be deadly to SOF units. Retired Israeli 
General Chaim Herzog emphasizes this point of SOFs inherent vulnerability in his 
memoirs concerning the legendary Entebbe raid in 1976. "In an operation such as that at 
Entebbe, all elements are interdependent. The slightest error, the slightest lack of 
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1996, p. 343). The preceding problem has often been defined and described with very 
fatalistic and deterministic language - battlefield friction, the fog of war, Murphy's law, 
fate, or simply bad luck. It certainly seems to explain the puzzling fact of why mission 
fail despite having adequate speed, surprise, security, and intelligence. The author 
subscribes to a different and ultimately more optimistic point of view on this 
phenomenon. Mission failure is less a problem of uncontrollable fate or bad luck and 
more of a failure to recognize and account for uncertainty in the operational environment. 
The author argues that the special operations environment is defined by 
uncertainty. The sheer dynamics of the environment creates uncertainty for the operators 
and planners. It is this uncertainty which increases risk for the operators on the ground. 
Therefore SOF missions are more likely to succeed when they are able to mitigate and 
reduce the level of uncertainty in the planning environment. (Where is the enemy? What 
are his intentions? What are his capabilities? What is his reaction time?). If this 
information is known or uncovered the special operator can devise a clever, robust plan 
that works to avoid the enemy's strengths and exploit his weaknesses, thus maximizing 
his chances for success. The problem is that in dynamic, unstable, environments reducing 
uncertainty to an acceptable level is very difficult. Information on the enemy or the 
objective is often unclear, conflicting, or simply not available. Let us deconstruct the 
concept of uncertainty in order to determine how it affects the military planning process. 
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C. UNCERTAINTY 
To act with confidence one must be willing to look ahead and consider 
uncertainties: Rather than asking such questions, too many people react to 
uncertainty with denial. They take an unconsciously deterministic view of' 
events. They take for granted that some things just can't and won't 
happen. Not having tried to foresee surprising events, they are at a loss for 
ways to act when upheaval continues. They create blind spots for 
themselves (Schwartz, 1991, p.3). 
The first step to understand how uncertainty effects the planning process is to 
define it. Uncertainty occurs when planners find it difficult to obtain accurate 
information due to a rapidly changing situation (Hodge et aI., 1996). Thus in broad terms 
uncertainty is defined as dynamic conditions that cause doubt, ambiguity or confusion as 
to what course of action to pursue. In the absence of indisputable or unchanging facts 
planners are often forced to make assumptions on what they believe to be true. The more 
dynamic a situation is the more assumptions must be made. The more these assumptions 
change or become unclear the greater amount of uncertainty. Thus uncertainty can be 
thought of as "imprecise estimates of future consequences conditional on present actions" 
(March, 1994, p. 178). 
Uncertainty can be further broken down into two distinct factors that are alluded 
to above. The first is unpredictability. Unpredictability occurs when the environment is 
very dynamic. Because the situation is still changing or evolving, planners are unable to 
establish a cause and effect relationship between critical variables. Thus it is difficult to 
determine which course of action is the best one to pursue because it is hard to determine 
a set sequence of events (Burton and Obel, 1995). 
The second factor that creates uncertainty in the environment is complexity. 
Complexity is defined as "the number and relatedness of environmental elements that 
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affect an organization" (Hodge et aI., 1996, p.l 07). Highly complex environments have 
large numbers of variables or factors that affect the decision making process. The more 
interdependent these variables are, the greater the level of complexity. Complexity 
hinders the decision makers ability to evaluate and process information. 
Figure I serves to illustrate the concept of uncertainty. It shows graphically how 
the concepts of complexity and unpredictability are linked to uncertainty. The model 
depicts how an increase in any of the initial values increases the total level of uncertainty. 
Instability 
(rate of change) > 
Unpredictability 
Ignorance of Data 
and cause and effect 






Figure 1. Deconstructing Uncertainty (Lawrence, 1981, pp. 311-337) 
In a relatively stable and predictable environment, organizations are able to buffer 
and insulate themselves from the factors that create uncerta~nty. Planners can base their 
strategies and decisions on established rules, and procedures. Their planning process can 
follow simple, standard procedures for picking the one best course of action since they 
have accurate knowledge of relevant facts as well as the consequences of all possible 
choices (March, 1994). 
Organizations that are confronted with dynamic environments do not have this 
luxury. "Organizations that must interact with many sectors, or elements within those 
sectors in which the elements or sectors are unrelated face a complex environment" 
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(Hodge et ai., 1996, p.l07). The result is they must adapt their structures, rules and 
procedures more radically to cope with a wide variety of unique problems. As 
uncertainty increases so does the demand for faster, more efficient information 
processing. 
D. THE PROBLEM OF UNCERTAINTY 
Decision makers do not consider all consequences of their alternatives. 
They focus on some and ignore others. Relevant information about 
consequences is not sought, and available information is often not used. 
Instead of calculating the "best possible" ' action, they search for an action 
that is 'good enough' (March, 1994). 
Planners have a difficult time during periods of great uncertainty. They feel 
constrained by the unpredictability of events. As the number of events increase, planners 
experience information overload due to uncertainty over what is important and what is 
not. The problem is that uncertainty caused by a lack of information, too much 
information, or conflicting information creates cognitive and motivational biases among 
planners (Arquilla, 1997; Jervis, 1989; Lebow, 1981; Posen, 1984). Thus planners tend 
to overlook information they already have; they ask for more information and then ignore 
the information they requested (March, 1994). As Robert Jervis notes, " The beliefs 
people hold and the inferences they draw do not change quickly in response to 
information they receive: people-statesmen, scientists and individuals in their everyday 
lives-tend to act in accordance with theories they already subscribe to rather than to 
fresh data" (Jervis, 1989, p. 196). 
The bottom line is that the natural human tendency when faced with difficult 
situations is to take short cuts. These short cuts are known as heuristics. Heuristics are 
patterns or "rules of thumb" that individuals use in place of detailed analysis and 
14 
calculation (March, 1994). Thus the tendency is to formulate plans based more on past 
experiences than on present conditions. While this phenomenon is not necessarily bad, it 
can lead to faulty planning if changing conditions render the operators assumptions 
obsolete and flawed. 
Based on these natural tendencies, planners often make two critical but common 
mistakes when faced with uncertainty (Courtney et al., 1997). The first mistake is to 
oversimplify a situation. Figure 2 below depicts this point. In Box 1 the oval illustrates a 
planning problem. Box 2 illustrates how narrowly focused planners will approach 
problems. They will typically focus on a single point of view or one course of action. 
These types of planners tend to overestimate their own ability and underestimate the 
enemy's ability. Box 3 depicts the consequences of approaching problems in this 
manner. The planner in this scenario has missed critical aspects of the problem (the area 
of the circle depicted outside the arrows). These types of planners approach problems 
with an overly narrow frame of reference. The end result is they don't see the real threats 
or take advantage of opportunities until it is too late. This becomes the narrow mind 
approach to planning. 
BOX I BOX 2 BOX 3 
Figure 2. "Narrow Mind" Strategy 
15 
A perfect example of the consequences of the "narrow mind" approach to 
uncertainty is illustrated by the events that led up to Operation Market Garden during 
World War II. The operation was designed to take the three biggest bridges that crossed 
the Rhine River into Nazi Germany. The bridges were located at Arnhem, Nijmegen and 
Grave. Two American and one British Airborne Division would seize the bridges in a 
lighting strike and then hold them until better equipped conventional forces relieved them 
in place. One of the planners of the Operation Brian Urquhart was particularly distressed 
with the cavalier attitude that seemed to plague senior planners. Urquhart observed that 
they seemed to believe that the operation had succeeded before they had even executed it. 
As I worked day and night on the information available in the topography 
of the area, the aerial photographs showing German positions and anti-
aircraft emplacements, the information coming in from various sources 
including the Dutch Resistance, and the mounting evidence that the 
German Army routed in Normandy was re-forming itself, I became 
increasingly anxious. I was also worried by the state of mind of General 
Browning and my brother officers. There. seemed to be a general 
assumption that the war was virtually over and that one last dashing stroke 
would finish it. The possibility of German opposition was scarcely 
considered worthy of discussion. The 'Market Garden' operation was 
constantly referred to as 'the party'. It was said that Colonel John Frost, 
the gallant commander of the 1 st Parachute Battalion, was considering 
taking along his golf clubs and ceremonial mess uniform (Urquhart, 1987 
p.70-71). 
As the operation drew closer and closer Urquhart continued to urge his senior 
commander, General Browning to look at the growing evidence of German armored 
strength in the vicinity of the bridges. The implications were clear. It would be very 
difficult for the lightly armed and equipped airborne troops to hold the objectives for a 
long period of time against such forces without heavy conventional support. 
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When I infonned General Browning and Colonel Walch of this 
development, they seemed little concerned and became quite annoyed 
when I insisted on the danger. They said as I remember, that I should not 
worry unduly, that the reports were probably wrong, and in any case the 
German troops were refitting and not up to much fighting" (Urquhart, 
1987 p.72). 
To his credit Urquhart was not deterred by his commander's rebukes and 
continued to press Browning to reconsider the infonnation that showed heavy Gennan 
activity in the area. In the end for all his troubles Urquhart was relieved of his duties and 
was ordered to go on sick leave immediately. One of the units doctors, Colonel Eggar 
infonned Urquhart that he was "suffering from acute nervous strain and exhaustion" 
(Urquhart, 1987, p.73). The operation was executed as planned and was according to all 
accounts a disaster for the Allies (Ryan, 1974). The Germans in actuality were fully 
capable, motivated and prepared to retake the bridges. During the debacle more than 
17,000 Allied soldiers were killed, captured, wounded or missing (Urquhart, 1987). Any 
hopes of ending the war early had been dashed by the ill-conceived operation. 
A second common mistake is to overestimate uncertainty. Planners become 
overly fatalistic and detenninistic in their ability to control events. Figure 3 depicts this 
point. In Box 1 the oval again represents the planning problem. Box 2 illustrates how 
certain planners become overwhelmed and overloaded by the details and complexity of 
the situation (information overload). Box 3 illustrates the consequences of this fatalistic 
and deterministic approach. Their response is to apply a less than rigorous or c<?mplete 
analysis of the situation. Potential problems are ignored or "wish away." This becomes 
the ''just do it" strategy (Courtney et al., 1997). Again the result is that planners in this 
scenario have missed critical aspects of the problem. 
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o 
BOX 1 BOX 2 BOX 3 
Figure 3. "Just Do It" Strategy 
A good example of the ''just do it" approach is illustrated by the events that led up 
to the debacle at Tobruk in September 1942. Many of the senior planners of the ill-fated 
raid publicly expressed serious misgivings prior to conducting the raid (Gordon, 1987). 
They argued that the plan was hopelessly complicated and was extremely risky at best. 
Captain David Sterling would comment that "the whole plan [had] sinned against every 
principle on which the SAS (British Special Air Service) was founded. Another would 
comment, "from the start the whole concept was too complex to be workable. Moreover, 
the whole process of planning seemed from the outset to have been handled in a 
recklessly lighted-hearted manner" (Gordon, 1987, p.l21). Despite all these misgivings 
by men in a position to change or scrub the mission, they amazingly went ahead with the 
whole operation with a sort of grim determination (Gordon, 1987; Owen, 1981). It is 
quite clear that the mission had taken on a life of it's own and no one seriously considered 
canceling it. It was the worst defeat that British Special Forces had ever suffered. It 
seem~ clear that the planners had adopted a dangerously fatalistic attitude about the whole 
mission. Instead of attempting to account for uncertainty they became overwhelmed and 
consumed by it - hence just do it. 
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As illustrated in the previous vignettes though planners try to be rational in their 
approach to solving difficult problems, they are constrained by the limits of their 
cognitive capabilities. As Richard Lebow observes, there seems to be three major 
"pathologies" that effect decisionmakers in their ability to plan. One, they tend to over 
evaluate past performances in relation to present realities. Two, they exhibit 
overconfidence in plans to which they are already committed to. Three, they tend to be 
insensitive to information that contradicts their plans (Lebow, 1981, p.112). 
The bottom line is that humans only can process so much information at one time. 
When confronted with great uncertainty, people have a natural tendency to simplify 
problems into something that is familiar and comfortable to them. The problem is that 
planners tend to draw from a limited past of observed events instead of a large pool of 
possible outcomes. They use a single frame of reference to analyze a problem. Thus their 
actions may be less than completely rational in spite of their best intentions. If planners 
do not consider all the information, it is likely to lead to faulty or incorrect assumptions 
(March, 1994). Faulty assumptions increase risk because plans will inevitably be based on 
incorrect or incomplete premises. On the ground this can often lead to mission failure. 
The special operators are left unprepared for events. The result is that they lose 
momentum. Rather than permitting the operator to control and dominate events, events 
dominate and control the operator. 
Unfortunately, individuals will always be limited by their own bounded rationality 
and personal biases when developing plans. It is an inevitable part of human nature. 
Fortunately, there are techniques to overcome these inherent problems. Successful 
planners recognize and account for uncertainty during the planning process. They use 
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various strategies and tools for developing robust plans that work quite well at controlling 
uncertainty. The following theory addresses this concept. 
E. THEORY: CONTROLLING UNCERTAINTY 
"In the fields of observation chance favors only the prepared mind." 
- Louis Pasteur 
SOF missions are successful when they are able to control uncertainty - to 
mitigate and reduce the level of uncertainty in the planning phase of an operation 
(McConnick, 1997). The logic is as follows. The more operators are able to reduce 
uncertainty, the more of the operational environment they are able to control. The more 
the operators are able to control the environment (to include their adversary) the less risk 
they incur. Finally, the more that the operator is able to reduce risk, the greater their 
chances are for success. Figure 4 illustrates this concept. 
uncertainty.ij. - Control t = Risk n ~.Higher ~ -I ~xpectation 
of Success 
Figure 4. Control Theory 
The issue of control is critical to understanding why SOF missions succeed or fail. 
The object is to maintain or gain control (dominance) over as much of the operational 
environment as possible. This concept is illustrated in Figure 5. The oval represents the 
operational environment that both SOF and their opponent "occupy" at a given time. A 
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subset of the environment is controlled by the operator and a subset is controlled by the 
opponent (a zero sum game: BOX 1). The area of the environment controlled by the 
enemy represents the amount of~certainty to the SOF operators. The more the operators 
are able to reduce the uncertainty (pushing the line to the right) the more control they 
have relative to their adversary (BOX 2) (McCormick, 1997). The end result is that it 
limits the adversary's ability (his options) to control/effect events in the environment. By 
reducing the enemy's choices, options and ability ~o respond the way he desires, he is 
forced to react to the operator's actions. 
BOX 1 BOX 2 
Figure 5. Control Theory 
It is important to emphasize that there always will be an inevitable amount of 
uncertainty in the operational environment. It is impossible to mitigate every uncertainty. 
The key is to reduce it enough to where the effects are relatively minimal. This allows 
the operator time to quickly adapt in the face of shifting external requirements that are 
inherent in dynamic environments (McCormick, 1997). This creates what the author calls 
"operational slack". If and when the operators lose surprise, speed, or command and 
control, they do not lose momentum. Thus operational slack provides the operators with 
flexibility or "breathing room" to improvise and adapt based on the local situation. It 
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expands the options and opportunities available to the operators instead of imposing 
limitations or constraints on his choices. As Colin Gray observes, "With so much 
uncertainty and so little margin for error, it is not surprising that special forces plan their 
operations in excruciating detail, mastery of which can provide a sound basis for 
emergency improvisation" (Gray, 1996, p.147). The question becomes what can planners 
do to control the environment in order to push the line to the right? 
Successful planners use three techniques to accomplish this difficult task. These 
techniques are adaptive learning, shaping, and hedging. SOF planners use these three 
techniques to "whittle" away at the uncertainty region and control the operational 
environment prior to the execution phase. These three planning tools are essentially 
strategies that planners use to manage a dynamic environment. While they are distinct 
concepts they are not applied separately. They operate in synergy to create a robust plan. 
F. SCOPE 
Planning in the face of uncertainty is a dilemma that is not exclusively limited to 
the realm of the special operations world. The author recognizes that this subject has 
much broader implications both to the rest of the military and the business world. 
However, to limit the scope of this study, this thesis will test its theory of special 
operations planning by focusing specifically on direct action missions at the tactical level. 
This thesis also does not attempt to analyze the strategic link of planning and execution, 
nor does it address the planning consideration of SOF in protracted campaigns. The 
typology of planning developed in this study makes no claim to universality. It purports 
only to identify and describe important patterns of SOF planning in the cases studied. 
The purpose is to call attention to the important attributes of effective planning for 
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uncertainty in the special operations environment. The focus is at the tactical planning 
and decision making level in direct action missions and specifically on the planning 
techniques used to mitigate uncertainty and reduce risk in those operations. 
G. METHODOLOGY 
The remainder of thesis will be devoted to exploring and expanding on the 
conceptual planning tools introduced by the author - adaptive learning, shaping, and 
hedging. Three historical case studies will be used to illustrate and emphasize important 
points of the theory. While there is a vast pool of special operation cases to choose from, 
useful comparative analysis requires that the cases should be relatively similar. 
The cases were chosen carefully to create a tough test for the theory. The cases 
that will be studied are the Israeli raid and hostage rescue at the Entebbe Airport in 
Uganda, Otto Skorzeny's raid to rescue Mussolini in Italy, and the U.S. raid to rescue 
POWs at Son Tay, North Vietnam. These cases were picked for the following reasons. 
First, in each case the special operators conducting the mission were specifically 
organized, trained and equipped to carry out such operations. Second, in each case the 
special operators were faced with a difficult planning scenario that exhibited roughly the 
same level and degree of uncertainty: a long range hostage rescue in enemy held territory. 
This is arguably the most difficult type of special operation to conduct since it requires 
successful infiltration and exfiltration on the part of the operators. Third, in all the cases 
the operators faced catastrophic failure from potentially dangerous opponents. While it is 
true that tactical skills of each opponent varied, mass does count. In each case the special 
operators were faced with opponents that were well armed and determined. The enemy 
had the ability to very quickly call on large reaction forces that were capable of destroying 
23 
the special operators. Finally, in all the cases their success or failure had strategic 
implications. In each case the operators were used to solve a national problem of extreme 
strategic importance. As a result the special operators had the backing, support and 
resources of their respective national authorities to include national intelligence assets in 
order to properly conduct the mission. 
The author concludes by analyzing how the planners in each case mitigated and 
controlled for high levels of uncertainty in the planning and preparation phases of each 
operation. Specific recommendations will be offered concerning how special operators 
and planners can increase the probability of success in future operations by properly 
applying control strategies and techniques discussed in the thesis - adaptive learning, 
shaping and hedging. 
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II. ADAPTIVE LEARNING 
The ability to learn faster than your competitors may be the only 
sustainable competitive advantage (De Geus, 1988, p. 71). 
A. DEFINITION 
The first tool that planners use to overcome uncertainty is a concept the author 
calls adaptive learning (Courtney et ai., 1997; Schwartz, 1991; Sherden, 1998). Adaptive 
learning directly addresses the issue of complexity. If you recall one of the fundamental 
problems that most planners often face is not too little information but too much 
information. Highly complex environments have large numbers of variables or factors 
that affect the decision making process. The more variables there are, the more difficult 
it is to sort out what is important and what is not. The more interdependent these 
variables are, the greater the level of complexity. The greater the complexity (number of 
interrelated variables) the greater the uncertainty. 
Adaptive learning is the art of cutting through the complexity problem: of 
identifying and focusing on the critical issues related to the specific situation. It is not 
merely collecting all the facts of a given situation, but learning what facts are important 
to solving the particular problem (Senge, 1990). This is the essential distinction. As a 
planning tool, adaptive learning connotes speed, agility, and flexibility of thought. 
Adaptive learning is the process of gaining and applying relevant knowledge 
faster than your opponent given the same chaotic environment. The idea is, "if you can 
think faster than your enemy, you can react and move one step ahead of him ... " 
(Edwards, 1997, p.64). It involves collecting, processing and utilizing the available 
information in innovative, creative ways (multi-framed thinking). This is accomplished 
by understanding more of how the opponent thinks than what he thinks - his cognitive 
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and motivational biases (what he believes to be true and what he wants to be true). 
Knowing how the enemy thinks creates opportunities and advantages that can be 
exploited with deception and clever ruses. Thus, adaptive learning is the process of 
applying ones knowledge of the enemy (how he thinks) against him to achieve the 
desired result. 
There are numerous historical examples of the successful use of adaptive learning 
techniques. Perhaps the oldest and most famous use of adaptive learning can be seen in 
Homer's, Odyssey. For more than 10 years Greek armies had laid siege to the fortified 
city of Troy. Using standard conventional military techniques, the Greeks had been 
unsuccessful in defeating the Trojans defenders. The Greek prophet, Calchus implored 
the senior Greek leaders to pursue a better strategy. "Stop battering away at these walls! 
You must devise some other way, some ruse ... We cannot take Troy by force alone, so 
we must find some cunning stratagem" (Bell and Whaley, 1991, p. 18). 
The Greeks warrior, Odysseus conceived (with the help of the sympathetic 
Goddess Athena) a clever scheme to breach the walled city with only a few brave and 
bold warriors (Arquilla, 1996; Bell and Whaley, 1991; Graves, 1996). He had the Greeks 
construct a giant wooden horse that was hollow inside. Once the structure was complete 
the Greeks hid a small band of warriors inside. The remainder of the Greek army gave all 
the necessary indications that they were retiring from the battlefield. They packed up 
their supplies and equipment, burned their camp and sailed away in plain sight of the . 
Trojans. Just before they departed however, they pushed the large wooden horse up to 
the gates of the city and left. The intent was to convey to the Trojans that the Greeks had 
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given up their hopes of conquering the city. Thus the wooden horse was left as a tribute 
to the Trojans. 
The ruse worked. The Trojans opened their gates and pushed the horse inside the 
walled city. That night, while most of the Trojans were asleep from a night of celebrating 
their apparent victory over the Greeks, the warriors inside the horse slipped out and 
opened the gates. The warriors then signaled the Greek fleet that had sailed just over the 
horizon during the day. The Greeks armies returned and sack the city of Troy over a 
period of three days (Bell and Whaley, 1991; Graves, 1996). 
The deception succeeded and Troy fell because Odysseus (with Athena's help) 
finally understood how the Trojans thought. They were just as weary of the siege as the 
Greeks were. The ruse played to the Trojans inherent biases. They wanted to believe the 
Greeks had given up (motivational bias). This false assumption was reinforced when 
they physically saw the Greeks sailed away in defeat (cognitive bias). Thus, the Greeks 
achieved a quick victory with cunning what they could not do in 10 years with 
conventional siege tactics. 
The Mongols in the thirteenth and fourteenth century were particularly good at 
using adaptive learning techniques on a regular basis as part of their doctrine. During this 
period, the Mongols managed to conquer much of China, Korea, Persia, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and Russia with a remarkably small standing army for that era - roughly 129,000 
men (Bell and Whaley, 1991; Marshall, 1993; Martin, 1971). They could ill afford to 
waste their limited resources on bloody encounters. Thus, the Mongols achieved their 
success not through superior numbers or brute force, but through their tactical and 
strategic planning skills. Before initiating any major operation, the Mongols would 
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thoroughly gather intelligence on the intended target and learn all they could about their 
opponent. Once the Mongols had obtained enough intelligence on a particular target they 
would incorporated numerous ruses, tricks, and deceptions to achieve advantageous over 
their opponent. The techniques they employed enabled the Mongols to exaggerate their 
true strengths, masked their actual movements, and concealed their real intentions. As a 
result their opponents were kept off-guard and off-balance. This strategy allowed the 
Mongols to often defeat larger forces with little to no actual bloodshed (Bell and Whaley, 
1991; Marshall, 1993; Martin, 1971). 
Figure 6 illustrates the concept of adaptive learning as it applies to special 
operations. Critical knowledge on the enemy is gained over time (BOX 1). The 
knowledge is used to gain insight on the enemy and learn how he thinks. This knowledge 
succeeds in enabling the special operator to control more of their environment (BOX 2). 
Thus the more critical knowledge one can gain on one's opponent, the less uncertainty 
one faces, and the more uncertainty you generate for your opponent (McCormick, 1997). 
Application of Knowledge 
TIME 
BOX I BOX 2 
Figure 6. Adaptive Learning Strategies 
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The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to illustrating how the concept of 
adaptive learning applies to a modem day case study. No case better illustrates this than 
Operation Thunderball - the Israeli raid to rescue hostages at Entebbe in 1976. This 
case is both useful and relevant because it illustrates how the planners of Operation 
Thunderball methodically used adaptive learning techniques to exploit their opponents 
and reduce uncertainty. 
B. ENTEBBE 
The Jews never deluded themselves. In any clash or confrontation, they 
would always be inferior numerically. On the face of it, a nation of three 
million can have no chance of holding out in endless war against one 
hundred million neighbors. And in Israel's twenty-eight years of 
existence, the Arab armies have always had more men, more tanks, more 
planes, more ships. The implication: in the face of massive enemy 
numbers, the army has been obligated to use imagination, cunning, 
wisdom, and originality. The bent for special operations, combat 
subterfuge, and surprise is deeply stamped in the character of the Israeli 
soldier from the General Staff down to the lowliest private. . 
(Ben-Porat et aI., 1976, p. 204). 
1. Situation 
On 27, June 1976, four terrorists with connections to the Baader-Meinhof Gang 
and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked Air France Flight 
139 during the plane's layover in Greece. The terrorists forced the Air France pilot to fly 
to Entebbe, Uganda after refueling in Libya. Once at Entebbe, the terrorists moved the 
hostages to Entebbe's old terminal building and separated the Israelis and Jews from the 
rest of the passengers. There were 77 Jewish and Israeli citizens among the 268 
passengers and crew. Later the non-Israeli and non-Jewish passengers were flown safely 
back to France. It was clear that the Israelis were the ultimate targets of the terrorists 
(Betser and Rosenberg, 1996; Herzog, 1996). 
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The terrorists demanded that 53 comrades in arms be released from jails in Israel 
(40 were in Israeli jails), West Germany, Kenya, Switzerland and France. They also 
demanded a 5 million dollar ransom fee from France. If their demands were not met they 
would execute the hostages. The deadline was set for 1300hrs on 4 July (Stevenson and 
Dan, 1976). 
While Israel had a long established policy of not negotiating with terrorists, it 
appeared to be a fait accompli. To most military observers the prospects of a military 
solution seemed suicidal. Israeli military planners were confounded by a host of 
problems and uncertainties from the very beginning. Where would the plane finally 
land? Was Uganda the final destination? Were the Ugandans helping the terrorists? 
Was it just the Israelis that the terrorists were after? 
The risk of any kind of military operation appeared to be extremely high. The 
hostages (nearly 100 men women and children) were being held in a hostile country 2200 
miles from Israeli territory. A dozen terrorists and a battalion of well-armed soldiers 
were guarding the hostages around the clock. 
The Ugandan military was also a major factor to consider and not to be taken 
lightly. The Ugandan Armed Forces were very well equipped for a poor nation. They 
were quite capable of defending their air and ground space. At the time of the crisis, over 
half the Ugandan Army (10,000 soldiers) was stationed near Kampala, which was only 
20 miles from Entebbe. The Ugandan Army had plenty of modern armored vehicles and 
artillery pieces and the Ugandan Air Force had over fifty combat planes to include 30 
MIG-9s and MIG 17s. Additionally a squadron of MIGs was on the Entebbe runway 
(Garret, 1980). 
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As if the situation was not difficult enough, the Israelis were also in a time 
crunch. If the Israelis were to attempt a rescue operation they had only about 96 hours to 
plan, rehearse and execute it before the deadline expired and the hostages were killed. 
Despite the difficult situation, the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin directed that the 
Israeli military to begin developing a rescue plan. 
2. Planning 
... less risk exists in a special operation planned ahead of time, down to its 
most minute detail, than in any large-scale operation involving thousands 
of troops, heavy vehicles, and artillery support. A well-prepared operation 
gives the advantage, through initiative, to the attacker, not the defender . 
.. . Our strength never lay in our sheer force but in our creative use of that 
force (Betser and Rosenberg, 1996, p. 228). 
The Israelis were no strangers t9 planning hostage rescues. They were well 
rehearsed and had learned a great deal from these types of operation. In the spring a 
1972, a faction of the PLO had hijacked a Sabena Airliner full of Israeli passengers. In a 
brilliantly bold but simple plan, Israeli special operators disguised as airline workers 
stormed the plane and succeeded in killing or capturing all the terrorists and safely 
rescuing all the passengers. It was the first successful airline hostage rescue in history 
(Betser and Rosenberg, 1996). Many of the same men that had been involved in planning 
the hostage rescue of the Sabena Airliner in 1972 were now involved in the Entebbe 
crisis. 
For the Entebbe crisis the fundamental problem that the planners faced was how 
to deal with the Ugandan military presence. Success hinged upon infiltrating and 
approaching the target undetected. The question was how to accomplish this? Even if 
the operators could successfully land undetected, how could they move quickly up to the 
terminal without alerting the Ugandan security force? The terrorist would have plenty of 
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time to react and kill the hostages. All the planners agreed that this was the key to the 
operation (Ben-Porat et aI., 1976; Betser and Rosenberg, 1996; Herzog, 1996). If they 
could get past the Ugandan security, they could defeat the small band of terrorists .. 
From this point on the planners devoted all their resources and focused their 
efforts with how to deal with the Ugandan outer security force. Before they could act· 
however they had to learn as much as they could about their opponents. Information 
began to steadily trickle in from various overt and covert sources. Fortunately for the 
Entebbe planners, Israel was blessed with an extremely effective and highly evolved 
intelligence network (The Mossad). A captured CIA document released by Iranian 
militants who overran the US embassy in Teheran detailed the US's glowing assessment 
of Israeli intelligence capabilities. "Israel's intelligence and security services are among 
the best in the world. Their expert personnel and sophisticated techniques have made 
them highly effective, and they have demonstrated outstanding ability to organize, screen 
and evaluate information obtained from recruited agents, Jewish communities and other 
sources throughout the world" (Raviv and Melman, 1990, p.3). Within hours after the 
terrorists had secured the hostages at Entebbe, Mossad agents were able to establish a 
base of operations in Nairobi Kenya. Operating from this clandestine location, Mossad 
agents were able to provide planners back in Israel with valuable "real time", "eyes on" 
intelligence on the situation in Entebbe. Utilizing small boats, Mossad agents rowed 
across Lake Victoria and conducted a clandestine ground reconnaissance of the target 
area (Raviv and Melman, 1990, p. 218-219). 
The planners also had readily available access to a wide variety of overt 
information on Entebbe as well. Perhaps the most unusual "open source" intelligence 
32 
asset was Idi Amin, the self-imposed dictator of Ugandan. To find out the real intentions 
of the Ugandans, the Israelis employed the services of one Burka Bar-Lev. Burka Bar-
Lev had been the Israeli Mission Chief to Uganda. During his tenure, Bar-Lev had 
established excellent rapport with Amin and still kept in contact with him on occasions. 
Bar-Lev was encouraged by Shimon Peres to call his "friend" to find out just how 
involved the Ugandans were in this whole crisis. Their phone conversations were 
recorded and analyzed both by Israeli intelligence personnel and psychiatrists to help 
develop a personality profile of the leader as well as to establish his possible motives and 
intentions concerning the hostages. From Bar-Lev's conversations with Amin it was 
clear that the Ugandans were aiding and supporting the terrorist (Ben-Porat et aI., 1976; 
Betser and Rosenberg, 1996; Stevenson and Dan, 1976). 
The planners also gained a lot of valuable information from the personal 
experiences of Israelis that had been stationed in Uganda. The Israeli military had spent 
numerous months training Ugandan pilots and soldiers in 1972 before relations had 
soured with Idi Amin. Many of the Israeli Air Force pilots were very familiar with the 
Entebbe Airport and all the normal routines, including Ugandan air traffic control 
procedures (Betser and Rosenberg, 1996; Stevenson and Dan, 1976). 
The planners discovered through their intelligence sources that a British transport 
plane was due to land at Entebbe just after midnight on 4 July. The Israelis reasoned that 
they could infiltrate a rescue force by air right behind the British aircraft without 
attracting attention from the Ugandan air traffic controllers. If the Israeli planes could 
shadow the British plane landing at Entebbe, an "unscheduled" landing would not alarm 
the air traffic controllers. The rescue force would be able to land unnoticed. 
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Additionally, the regular flight line noise that was nonnal to all airports would help mask 
the operator's movements to the old tenninal (Betser and Rosenberg, 1996). 
The question now turned to how to get to the hostages. Again the planners 
focused their efforts on gathering infonnation that would help solve this difficult 
problem. One of the best sources of infonnation came from a French hostage that had 
been release after spending three days at the Entebbe Airport. This particular hostage had 
served in the French military. During his time at Entebbe he had made numerous mental 
notes on details he thought would be important for any military options to rescue the 
hostages (Betser and Rosenberg, 1996). After his release in Paris, Mossad agents quietly 
contacted and interviewed this fonner hostage. From his debriefing the Israelis gained 
invaluable insight into the capabilities, weaknesses and daily routines of both the 
terrorists and the Ugandan guards. 
Again, the Israelis were fortunate that many of their soldiers had spent time in 
Ugandan training soldiers. One of those men was Major Muki Betzer. Betser had spent a 
considerable amount of time training with Ugandan troops in 1972 and was quite familiar 
with the tactics and skills of the Ugandan soldiers. He was now the reserve commander 
of the elite Israeli counter-terrorist unit, The Sayert Maktal (special scouts) and was one 
of the primary planners of Operation Thunderball. Based on his personal experience he 
recalled that many high-ranking leaders in the Ugandan Anny traveled around in black 
Mercedes. For security purposes these entourages were typically escorted by one or more 
Land Rovers of troops to act as bodyguards. It was also not unusual for these dignitaries 
to visit or inspect their troops from time to time. From this infonnation and the 
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information gathered from the released French hostage, the Israelis were able to devise a 
clever scheme to get past the Ugandan outer security forces without alerting the terrorists. 
The Israelis acquired a black Mercedes and several Land Rovers identical to the 
ones used by the Ugandan dignitaries. Sayeret Matkal operators with blackened faces and 
Ugandan style uniforms would slowly drive through the Ugandan checkpoints so as not 
to arouse suspicions. They would keep their hea~lights on and even offer salutes to the 
guards who would certainly challenge their arrival. They could literally drive right up to 
the main entrance of the old terminal without firing a shot (Betser and Rosenberg, 1996). 
Once at the old terminal the special operators would focus on eliminating the 
terrorists and freeing the hostages. The special operators in the Mercedes and the first 
Land Rover would be the "break-in force". The operators in the third Land Rover would 
provide outer security to the break in force until reinforcements landed in follow-on 
planes. The follow-on forces made up of paratroopers would support and isolate the 
Ugandans security force with heavy weapons, armored vehicles and standard infantry 
tactics (Betser and Rosenberg, 1996; Stevenson and Dan, 1976). 
3. Execution 
We did not celebrate a victory that night. For the Unit, even one casualty 
is proof that our performance did not match our plan. To maintain its 
abilities, a unit like Sayeret Matkal must always learn from its mistakes, 
facing honestly and truthfully what went wrong (Betser and Rosenberg, 
1996, p. 269). 
The execution of Operation Thunderball was conducted brilliantly, but it was not 
flawless. Contrary to popular belief, everything did not go according to plan. The 
operators made numerous mistakes on the ground: mistakes that resulted in the only 
casualties of the operation. 
35 
Mistakes occurred on the approach to the tenninal by the assault force. The plan 
had called for the operators who were disguised as, distinguished visitors, to very calmly 
drive by the Ugandan sentries as if nothing was unusual. This did not happened. As the 
black Mercedes crammed with special operators approached, a lone Ugandan sentry 
snapped to attention with his rifle and ordered the convoy to advance. The actions of the 
Ugandan guard was expected to happen but for some reason that will never be known, 
Colonel Netanyahu (Commander of the Sayeret Matkal and the assault force commander) 
decided to change the plan (Betser and Rosenberg, 1996). Netanyahu ordered his driver 
to swerve closer to the sentry so he could finish him off. Betser recalls arguing with 
Netanyahu to leave the sentry alone. NetanYahu ignored Betser and again ordered the 
driver to swerve closer to the sentry. Both NetanYahu and another operator, Giora 
Zussman, fired their silenced 22 caliber pistols at the surprised sentry. 
This one mistake caused a chain reaction of mistakes to occur. The sentry fell, 
but not for good, as he tried to get back up, an operator in the last Land Rover silenced 
him forever with a long (and very loud burst) from his AK-47. The orders had been very 
clear; no shooting until the assault force was inside the old tenninal building. The assault 
force had lost its element of surprise with several hundred meters to go. 
At this point the assault force began to panic when they realized what had 
happened. Ugandans alerted by the firing started returning fire sporadically at the convoy 
that was now speeding very quickly to reach the tenninal. Instead of parking five meters 
from the entrance the special operators abandoned the vehicles with still about 50 meters 
to go. Racing toward their assigned entrances the assault force began receiving more 
accurate fire from Ugandan guards positioned around the tenninal. 
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When the operators finally reached the building instead of moving with their 
teams to their assigned entrances the assault team bunched up near one of the entrances. 
According to Betser, there was an agonizing pause. In the chaos, the operators became 
confused as to where all their teammates were, and which were their assigned entrances. 
Betser discovered to his horror that his entrance door was blocked. He was forced to go 
in a different door. 
The situation inside the building was just as confusing. As the assault force 
entered the building, the now alerted terrorists were firing from among the hostages. 
Relying on their skill and marksmanship, the assault force succeeded in killing six 
terrorists. Unfortunately in the chaos and confusion, the operators mistook a hostage for 
a terrorist when he leaped up too quickly. Regrettably, the operators shot and killed him 
by mistake. Two other hostages were also killed due to ricocheting bullets. At this point 
Betser also learned that a sniper from the control tower had mortally wounded Colonel 
Netanyahu. The control tower had been identified in the planning and rehearsal phase as 
a critical piece of terrain that the Israelis. must control. It was supposed to have been 
silenced by the support forces. It never was. Throughout the short duration of the 
operation, shots continued to come from the control tower. It was never effectively 
silenced (Betser and Rosenberg, 1996; Stevenson and Dan, 1976). 
C. ANALYSIS 
1. Was Operation Thunderball a Success? 
Clearly the answer is yes. Operation Thunderball was an incredible victory for 
Israel both strategically and tactically. Strategically, it was a success for several reasons. 
First, it demonstrated to the world Israel's public pledge and commitment not to negotiate 
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with terrorists. Second, it illustrated Israel's capability, detennination and resolve to 
fight and win the battle against international terrorism. Third, it sent a clear message to 
would-be terrorists that they were not beyond the reach of the Israeli Defense Force 
(IDF). Fourth, it helped to raise the morale of Israeli citizens. It demonstrated Israel's 
finn public commitment to protect her own citizens at all costs. 
The operation at Entebbe was also a solid tactical success for Israel because the 
planners and operators accomplished all their pre-stated goals. First, the operation was 
conducted with minimal casualties to the hostages and the rescuers. The planners 
anticipated a minimum of 10 casualties to the rescuers and the hostages. On the ground 
the operators incurred only four casualties. Second, the operation was conducted quickly 
and according to schedule. The planners anticipated the operation would take at least 60 
minutes. The actual operation took only 57 minutes.. Finally and most importantly the 
plan accounted for and controlled uncertainty. The operators were prepared for and 
reacted to every contingency on the ground. The operators controlled and dominated the 
operational environment for the entire duration of the mission. It is even more 
remarkable to consider that the planners developed Operation Thunderball in just under 
four days and the operators had only a day to rehearse before carrying out the mission 
(Betser and Rosenberg, 1996; Herzog, 1996; Stevenson and Dan, 1976). 
2. Was Operation Thunderball a Tough Test for the Theory? 
The Entebbe case represents an extremely tough test in all aspects. First, one has 
to consider and appreciate the sheer distance of where the hostages were being held with 
respect to Israel. The operators had to infiltrate into a hostile country that was more than 
2000 miles away. Additionally with the exception of Kenyan, Ugandan was surround by 
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countries that were "less than sympathetic" to the Israeli situation. Thus if things went 
wrong the Israelis would find no safe harbor or quarter with neighboring countries. 
Second, was the sheer size and disposition of the enemy on the ground. While the 
Ugandans were certainly a fourth rate military force, mass does count. If the Israelis had 
been delayed on the ground, they could have easily been annihilated by sheer numbers of 
Ugandan troops in the vicinity of Entebbe. Finally, the Israelis were afforded little time 
to respond to a very difficult situation. There was a tremendous amount of uncertainty 
due to the dynamics of the event, the compressed planning schedule and sketchy 
intelligence. The Israelis had only about 96 hours to plan, prepare and execute a highly 
complex rescue operation. 
3. Conclusion 
On the surface it is puzzling how the Israelis were able to pull off such a brilliant 
operation. Clearly the operators made numerous mistakes in the first crucial minutes of 
the operation which resulted in the loss of surprise, speed and command and control. 
These mistakes could have arguably resulted in the ultimate failure of the entire 
operation. Yet despite these difficulties the operation succeeded. Why? 
In a remarkably short period of time (a little under 96 hours) thanks in part to a 
highly evolved intelligence network the Entebbe planners were able to sort through a 
complex crisis, and reduce operational uncertainties with a cleverly crafted and cunningly 
executed plan. The Israelis succeeded at Entebbe not because of overwhelming force, 
superior speed or incredible surprise; they succeeded because they were able to outthink 
their opponents. 
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From the beginning of the crisis the Israelis never underestimate their oppOnent's 
ability or overestimate their own. They were careful not to draw too many conclusions or 
lessons from their past successes. One of the fundamental lessons that the Israelis had 
learned in dealing with terrorists is that they, (the terrorists) learn too. They realized that 
if they were to succeed they had to learn faster than the terrorists. As Muki Betser 
observes "Ever since the Sabena rescue in the spring of 1972, the Unit [The Israeli 
counter terrorist unit] had kept developing doctrines and methods for rescuing hijacked 
planes on the ground. We never used the same ploy twice. Just as we learn from each 
incident, so do the terrorists" (Betser and Rosenberg, 1996, p.231). Thus in order to 
succeed, Entebbe had to be approached differently than previous rescues. 
It bears repeating that adaptive learning is all about thinking and learning faster 
than ones opponent. This creates the opportunities that are essential ~o defeating larger 
better equipped opponents. The Israelis gained the initiative over their opponents 
because their plan played to the inherent cognitive and motivational biases of their 
adversaries. The Ugandans and the PLO terrorists wanted to believe it was an impossible 
situation for the Israelis. Therefore the Israelis would have to negotiate. After all, the 
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said he was willing to bargain for the release of the 
hostages (Betser and Rosenberg, 1996; Herzog, 1996). Thus while their opponents were 
quite complacent to believe this situation was a fait accompli, the Israelis used their 
available time wisely. In the short 96 hours sequence they were able to cultivate and craft 




Know that the future isn't found; it is invented. It is shaped by people 
with the vision, courage, and wisdom to think beyond the boundaries of 
the known (Sherden, 1998, p.245). ' 
-Robert Kriegel 
A. DEFINITION 
The concept of shaping is the second key element to planning in uncertainty 
(Courtney et aI., 1997; Sherden, 1998). Just as adaptive learning strategies address the 
problem of complexity; shaping strategies address the problem of unpredictability in the 
environment. If you recall, unpredictability is a function of how dynamic the situation is 
(the rate of change) coupled with an acute ignorance of data - an absence of a clear 
cause/effect relationship of the pertinent .variables. Shaping strategies seek to reduce 
uncertainty by making an unpredictable situation irrelevant through innovation. 
Shaping strategies accomplish this task by utilizing or applying new technologies 
or tactics against an opponent. As Bell and Whaley point out "technological innovations" 
produce the "impossible options" (Bell and Whaley, 1991). Thus instead of trying to 
predict the future, the object of shaping is to invent it. Shapers change the rules of the 
game and the size of the playing field to suit their advantage. 
One of the earliest examples of shaping comes from the bible. It is the story of 
David and Goliath (Samuel 17: 1-17 :49). The Israelites and the Philistines were warring 
against each. As was the custom during this period each side would often choose a single 
combatant to decide the outcome of the entire battle. The Philistines had a very imposing 
champion named Goliath who was nine feet tall according to the bible and had a 
reputation as a fearsome warrior. For forty days Goliath would stand out on the 
battlefield in full armament and taunt the Israelites to send out a champion, but none of 
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the Israelites dared to challenge the 'giant, sword against sword. Finally a young Israelite 
boy named David accepted the challenge but walked onto the battlefield anned only with 
a sling and five stones. Goliath was totally bewildered by this apparently foolish and 
soon to be dead boy. David however had the last laugh. His first stone that he slung at 
the giant struck him in the head, killing him instantly and sending the demoralized . 
Philistines into flight. The lesson is clear. Had David attacked Goliath sword against 
sword, it is certain the giant would have quickly slaughtered him. Instead David changed 
the rules of the game to his advantage and fought the giant on his terms (from a safe 
distance). He killed Goliath with a weapon that was not normally used in combat. 
Goliath was accustomed to fighting men with his sword at close distance, not having 
rocks hurled at him with a sling. He was totally unprepared for this "technological 
innovation" employed by the young Israelite. 
As illustrated by the last example, shaping has the ability to generate great 
surprise for the user. By choosing the "impossible possible", the opponent is neither 
physically nor mentally prepared for your actions against him (Bell and Whaley, 1991). 
This also serves to increase the level of uncertainty for your opponent (while reduce your 
own uncertainty) by changing the rules that he is used to operating by (Courtney et aI., 
1997). Because you are using new tactics or technology against your opponent you 
effectively limit his available options to respond while expanding your own options to 
act. The bottom line is that shaping is effective because it creates advantages and options 
that are not available to your adversary. 
A more recent example of shaping is illustrated by the German glider assault on 
Eben Emael. The sole purpose of the raid on Eben Emael was to enable the German 
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Army to cross the Albert Canal into Belgian territory. Once the Germans crossed into 
Belgium they would be able to quickly drive through France (the ultimate goal). The fort 
at Eben Emael stood in this way of this goal. Her powerful 75 and 125-mm guns could 
make it extremely difficult for the Germans to cross the canal over any of the three 
bridges that spanned it. Therefore the raiders had to disable the fort's guns before the 
German Army tried to cross the canal (Mrazek, 1970). 
The Belgians also had realized the strategic importance of the fort's guns and had 
taken every known precaution to strengthen and protect the guns from possible attacks. 
They had strung miles of barbwire and sewn a minefield around the perimeter of the top 
of the fort to protect it from ground assaults. The gun positions themselves were also 
hardened to protect them from explosive charges and aerial bombardments. The 
casemates and cupolas built around the guns were constructed of ,heavily reinforced 
concrete and steel (McRaven, 1995). 
Thus the Belgians considered the guns to be virtually invulnerable. The idea that a 
small band of commandos with explosive charges could disable the guns was utterly 
inconceivable to the Belgians who defended Eben Emael. It was not in the realm of the 
possible and therefore not planned against. Unknown to the Belgians however, the 
Germans had secretly tested a revolutionary new explosive devise that could defeat the 
walls of the cupola (McRaven, 1995). These "hollow charges" as they were called, when 
placed directly against a target could breach the cupolas and casemates. The Germans 
used this new invention to great effect against the very vulnerable Belgian guns. Had the 
Belgians been aware of such a devise they might have prepared the defenses of the 
fortress differently. 
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Shaping can also mean the application of existing technology in a way that was 
previous not considered for military use. Again let us tum to the assault on Eben Emael 
to illustrate this point. The Belgian's expected that the Germans might attack the fort. 
They prepared and rehearsed all the possible scenarios for such an attack and were 
comfortable that they had all the contingencies covered (Mrazek, 1970). 
Unfortunately, the Germans use of gliders was not an option that the Belgians had 
considered. Though gliders were fairly common during this period of time, they were 
used strictly for recreation and sport. The Germans however saw the military potential of 
using gliders to achieve surprise. Although the Belgians were prepared for a possible 
German attack, the use of gliders stunned them into complete inaction and disbelief 
(Mrazek, 1970). The Belgians had no pre-planned drills or procedures to counter such an 
event. The use of gliders in this operation clearly was instrumental in the success of the 
operation. The point is the Belgian's were not surprised or unprepared by the Germans 
attack on the fort. They were surprise and unprepared for the method that the Germans 
used to attack the fort. 
Figure 7 illustrates this concept. The enemy (Box 1) is focused in the direction of 
the white arrow. This is his perceived realm of possible events. Shaping allows one to 
approach the enemy in an unexpected manner (the black arrow) out of the opponent's 
realm of thought. Again this allows the special operators to control more of the 
environment (BOX 2). 
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Figure 7. Shaping Strategies 
BOX 2 
Shaping when properly applied gives the user a tremendous advantage over an 
adversary. It has the ability to make up for otherwise serious shortfalls in the planning 
and execution phases of an operation. The case that best illustrates this point is Operation 
Oak - the German special operations rescue of Mussolini. Clearly shaping played an 
important role in the ultimate success of a flawed mission. 
B. GRAN SASSO 
We must find out where the Duce [Benito Mussolini] is being held and 
free him. That is the mission I have for you Skorzeny, and I have chosen 
you because I am convinced that you will succeed with this operation 
(Skorzeny, 1995, p. 230). 
-Adolf Hitler July 26, 1943 
1. Situation 
On 26 July 1943, the King of Italy, Victor Emmanuel, dismissed his Prime 
Minister, Benito Mussolini and replaced him with General Pietro Badglio. Subsequently, 
Mussolini was arrested and then disappeared from the public eye. This angered and 
troubled Hitler greatly. Not only was Mussolini a personal friend of the Fuhrer but also a 
loyal supporter of the Axis alliance. While publicly the Italians pledged their continued 
support for the Germans, privately they were working to cut a deal with the Allies. 
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Hitler reasoned correctly that Mussolini's arrest was a trigger for Italy's defection 
to the Allies. Hitler hoped that if he could liberate Mussolini he might be able to prevent 
this from occurring. He therefore tasked his newly formed and trained special operations 
unit commanded by Otto Skorzeny to find and rescue Mussolini. Hitler gave the rescue 
operation top priority. 
2. Planning 
Only five men would actually know all the details of the Operation Oak. Of those 
five men, General Kurt Student, Captain Otto Skorzeny, and his second in command Karl 
Radl would develop the plan to free Mussolini. These individuals were highly suited for 
this challenge. Skorzeny and Radl were member of the shadowy and newly formed 
German commando force known as Jagverbande 502 (Hunting Group). This unit was 
specially designed and created to conduct sabotage and subversion operations behind 
enemy lines. Captain Otto Skorzeny commanded the unit and had personally selected 
and trained all the soldiers in the unit (Skorzeny, 1950; Tanner, 1997). 
General Kurt Student was also no stranger to special operations. He was the 
commander of the elite XI Air Corps. As the commander he had been intimately involved 
in the highly successful assault on the Belgian fortress complex at Eben Emael and the 
bloody but successful assault on Crete (Arquilla, 1996). He would draw on the lessons 
he learned from both these operations to help develop the operation to rescue Mussolini. 
The men in this ad-hoc planning cell were perfect foils for each others 
personalities. Skorzeny and Radl could be characterized as bold, innovative, imaginative 
thinkers and dreamers (Garret, 1980; McRaven, 1995; Tanner, 1997). They were quite 
willing to accept a great deal of risk to achieve success and glory at all costs (Skorzeny, 
46 
1950). Student on the other hand was a far more careful, practical and cautious man. 
Prior to executing Operation Oak, Student and his technical staff poured over the details 
of the plan that Skorzeny and Radl had devised. Student was deeply concerned for the 
lives of his paratroopers that would support the special operators in rescuing Mussolini. 
He was not about to sacrifice any of his paratroopers on an ill-conceived operation. As 
Skorzeny recalls, General Student was not intimidated by a sense of urgency. Despite 
Hitler's orders for success at all costs, Student flatly refused to put up with any "hare 
brained" schemes for rescuing Mussolini (Skorzeny, 1995). It was only after great debate 
and numerous changes that the final plan was approved for execution. 
There were two key questions that had to be resolved in order to conduct the 
operation. First, how would the special operators assault the objective without being 
detected? After considerable detective work and numerous false trails and dead ends, 
Skorzeny and Radl discovered that Mussolini was being held at the Albergo-Rifugio 
Hotel on the Gran Sasso Mountain. The hotel itself was located on a plateau in an 
extremely rugged and isolated spot that was only accessible from a cable car that ran 
from the valley down below. 
Second, once the operators made it to Gran Sasso how would they handle the 
Italian guards? There were approximately 200 to 250 Italian Carabinieri guarding 
Mussolini at his hotel prison. Skorzeny's intelligence sources also informed him that the 
guards had orders to shoot Mussolini if they detected a rescue operation in progress. 
Thus the Germans had to craft a plan that would allow them maximum time to get to 
Mussolini before the Italians could react (McRaven, 1995; Garret, 1980). 
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The first question was how could the special operators approach the hotel without 
being detected? The only way to quickly approach the hotel by land was by the cable car. 
Unfortunately, the cable car station was guarded by Italian soldiers both at the terminal in 
the valley and at the terminal on the mountain. Even if the Germans successfully 
attacked the cable car station in the valley, the guards at the top would have plenty of 
time to defend the hotel and or kill Mussolini before the Germans arrived. 
The planners considered several options to accomplish this. The first was by 
conducting a parachute assault on the hotel grounds. This action was quickly ruled out. 
While a parachute assault would allow the Germans to approach undetected it was 
considered far too treacherous even for the daring and bold special operators (McRaven, 
1995; Skorzeny, 1995). First, the air at 6300 feet was very thin. The rate of decent for the 
special operators would be too fast. The planners reasoned they would incur too many 
casualties just on the approach. Second, the winds at this altitude were extremely erratic. 
The special operators and paratroopers would be scattered across the mountainside. It 
would take to long for them to mount an organized assault once they were on the ground. 
Again the Italians would have ample time to defend against the Germans. 
The second option was by ground assault. This would entail a raiding force 
climbing the mountain and then assaulting the hotel. Again this option was quickly ruled 
out for numerous practical reasons. It would simply be too difficult to move up the 
mountain undetected and in any condition to assault 200 plus Italians defending the high 
ground. 
The planners determined that gliders would be the best means of approaching and 
assaulting the hotel. Initially, General Student was vehemently opposed to the use of 
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gliders, largely for the same reasons that a parachute drop was ruled out: the combination 
of the thin air, the unpredictable winds, and the small landing area spelled disaster. 
Student believed the special operators might incur 80 percent casualties just on the 
approach. Skorzeny argued that Student and his technical experts were being too 
cautious. First, this type of assault had never been done before so how could they be so 
sure it would not work? Second, he also pointed out that the new DFS 230 gliders that 
would be used had an improved braking system that would allow for safer landings. 
Third, he pointed out that Mussolini could be moved at anytime as he had in the past. 
This might be their best and only opportunity at freeing him before he was turned over to 
the Allies. Fourth, Skorzeny argued that the Italians would never expected such an 
unorthodox approach. It would catch them completely by surprise. Student reluctantly 
agreed because of the pressures of time. It was the best alternative under the 
circumstances (McRaven, 1995; Skorzeny, 1995). 
The second question that had to be resolved was how to deal with the Italian 
guards. This problem was made more difficult by the fact that the Italians were still 
technically allies with the Germans. It was uncertain how they would even react to the 
Germans sudden presence at Gran Sasso. A bloody assault might only make the situation 
worse both in the short term (on the objective) and in the long term (the political 
ramifications). 
Skorzeny decided to implement a new tactic he had been working on while 
studying the results of a failed British commando raid to capture the German General 
Irwin Rommel (Skorzeny, 1995). He had concluded that the reason the British 
commandos had failed was that they fired their weapons too early in the assault. As a 
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result they lost their one key leverage of tactical surprise. He reasoned there is often 
more to be gained by not firing. "It is bewildering for the enemy who logically shouldn't 
be there to suddenly appear and come towards him. He doesn't believe his eyes. In this 
way the moment of surprise is extend, which is necessary for success. Just one shot fire 
by the attackers is enough to awaken the self-preservation instinct of those being attacked 
and they will automatically fire back. Nothing is more contagious than a shot" 
(Skorzeny, 1995, p.156)! Since the Italians were still allies, not shooting would further 
confuse them to the Germans intentions. Thus Skorzeny made the bold decision to assault 
the objective without firing any small arms at the Italians defending the objective unless 
he personally ordered it. 
As an after thought Radl came up with the brilliant idea to take along an Italian on 
the raid. They picked one Ferdinando Soleti. He was a well known General in the Italian 
Carabinieri. His presence would serve to both confuse and convince the Italians not to 
resist (McRaven, 1995; Skorzeny, 1995). 
3. Execution 
'Duce, the Fuhrer has given me orders to free you!' He shook my hand 
and hugged me, with the words 'I knew my friend Adolf Hitler would not 
leave me in the lurch!' Benito Mussolini was extremely moved and his 
black eyes glistened. I must confess that this was one of the greatest 
moments in my life (Skorzeny, 1995, p.263). 
Operation Oak was executed on 11 September 1943. Minor delays and mishaps 
plagued the assault force from the time they took off until they landed at the mountain. 
Initially the gliders were scheduled to take off at 0600. The raiders were scheduled to 
land at 0700. There were several important advantages to this time sequence. First, the 
assault force would have a better chance of landing undetected due to the early hour of 
the day and the decreased visibility. The guards certainly would not be in a highly alert 
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state of mind. Second, the winds at this time of the morning would be at their calmest. 
Unfortunately all the advantages were erased. Skorzeny received word that the gliders 
had been delayed in their arrival from an airfield in France (Skorzeny, 1995). 
Both Skorzeny and Student decided not to push the mission back another day. 
Time was of the essence since they did not know how long Mussolini would remain at 
the hotel before he was moved again. Instead they pushed back the mission to 1400 hours 
that same day. Their assumptions proved to be correct. After the raid, Skorzeny learned 
that Mussolini was supposed to be handed over later that afternoon to Allied forces 
(Skorzeny, 1995). 
The gliders finally arrived later that morning and the assault force began 
preparing them for the operation. As luck would have it, just fifteen minutes before the 
operators were suppose to takeoff, Allied planes began bombing the airfield. The Allied 
planes managed to crater parts of the runway but fortunately for the Germans none of the 
raiders or gliders were damaged in the raid. The gliders took off at 1300 hours as 
scheduled for the one-hour flight to Gran Sasso. 
Problems did occur on the takeoff however. Two of the tow planes crashed into 
bomb craters. Thus two of the glider (out of twelve) never left the airport. Skorzeny 
confesses in his memoirs that he was never aware of this fact. However, it is doubtful 
given the importance placed on the mission, that he would have scrubbed the operation 
(Skorzeny, 1995). 
More problems occurred during the short flight to Gran Sasso. With only a few 
minutes before the scheduled release time, Skorzeny learned from his pilot that the lead 
plane and glider that were suppose to guide the entire force onto the objective was 
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nowhere in sight. This not only meant that another plane would now have to take the 
lead, but also that that assault force would not have the planned support when they landed 
or when they assaulted the hotel. Skorzeny made the quick decision to take the lead. He 
reasoned that he would now have to land first in order to accomplish the mission since he 
could achieve better speed and surprise that way (Skorzeny, 1995). 
Skorzeny instructed his pilot to take the lead and informed the rest of the gliders 
of the change in plans. Unfortunately, Skorzeny had not planned or anticipated leading 
the gliders into the target. . He quickly discovered that he was unable to see out his 
window to orient himself to his new task. He had to cut a hole in the thin canvas skin of 
the glider so he could orient himself to the terrain below. 
As the planes made their approach to the objective more problems occurred. The 
approach was much steeper and rockier than the planners had anticipated. It was not the 
small gentle sloped meadow that appeared to be in the photos they had taken. Instead it 
was a small boulder strewn field. General Student had specifically instructed the pilots 
to abort the mission if it was determined that the landing area was unsuitable (McRaven, 
1995; Skorzeny, 1995). Under no circumstances were the gliders to make a controlled 
crash landing. Clearly Skorzeny ignored this order. He shouted for his glider pilot to 
release the tow cable and land as close to the hotel as possible. 
After a very harrowing descent Skorzeny' s glider skidded to a halt just 15 meters 
from the hotel. Immediately the assault force piled out of the wreckage and raced for the 
hotel. By all accounts the Italian guards were completely astonished when Skorzeny and 
his team quickly disembarked out of the glider and ran by surprised Italian sentries 
without firing a shot. As Skorzeny recalls, "At the comer of the hotel building, close to a 
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slight bank, stood the first gendarme. Obviously stupefied, he did not even stir; no doubt 
he was still wondering how we could possibly have fallen out of the very skies " 
(Skorzeny, 1950, p.96). 
The operators forced their way into the nearest door available. Unfortunately it 
was a small room that had no other entrances to the hotel. It was being used as a 
communications center. The special operators departed the room and search for another 
entrance to the hotel but not before destroying the radio gear in the room. Again fortune 
smiled on the Germans. They later learned the radio operator was in the process of 
sending out a message to higher command that strange aircraft were landing at the hotel 
(Skorzeny, 1995). 
The assault team ran around the backside of the hotel desperately trying to find an 
entrance into the hotel. They finally came to a terrace that overlooked the hotel grounds. 
Hoisting themselves up and over the terrace's twelve-foot ledge the assault team found 
themselves at the main entrance of the hotel. It was at this moment that Skorzeny spotted 
who he believed to be Mussolini in a second story window. 
Unfortunately, the Italians finally were starting to come to life. Guards were 
beginning to set up machine guns positions near the main door when the assault team 
began to enter. Still no shots had been fired. As Skorzeny attempted to get to Mussolini, 
Italian guards blocked his path on the staircase. A bloody altercation might have ensued 
but General Soleti stepped forward as planned and identified himself to the Italian Officer 
in charge. The Italians though clearly confused immediately lowered their weapons 
(Garret, 1980; McRaven, 1995; Skozeny, 1995). 
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Bulling his way past the very bewildered Italian guards, Skorzeny raced up the 
stairs and into a room where he found Mussolini with two Italian guards and one man in 
civilian cloths. Just then two more special operators entered through the opened window. 
They had managed to climb up the railing to get inside the room where Mussolini was 
being held. Mussolini now was safely for the moment in the special operator's hands. ' 
The entire operation up until this point had taken only about four minutes, all without 
firing a single shot. 
While they did have control of Mussolini, the special operators still did not have 
control of the situation. A few shots rang out in the distance to punctuate this. Skorzeny 
realized that the situation could deteriorate rapidly if he did not act quickly. Although 
taken by surprise the Italians still outnumbered the Germans and the planned 
reinforcements still had not arrived to the top of the mountain via the cable car. The 
carabinieri had to be disarmed quickly. 
Skorzeny demanded to speak to the officer in charge. Within a few moments an 
Italian Colonel, Giuseppe Gueli stepped forward and identified himself as commander of 
the guard force. Skorzeny forcefully demanded that Gueli order his guards to surrender 
or further bloodshed would result. Skorzeny boldly gave the colonel one minute to think 
it over. The colonel reluctantly complied. A bed sheet was hung out the window to 
signal Lieutenant von Berlepsch (commander of the paratroopers) with instructions. 
Berlepsch moved his paratroopers from their positions to surround the hotel and began 
disarming the stunned Italian guards. By this time the reinforcements had made it to the 
mountain giving the Germans numerical superiority over the Italians (McRaven, 1995; 
Skorzeny, 1995). 
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The task now became getting Mussolini off the mountain. The special operators 
had devised three options for accomplishing this. Option A (the option of choice) could 
not be used because the operators could not get radio contact with Rome to request the 
planes. Option B (the second choice) also was ruled out when the operators learned that 
the Storch that landed in the valley had damaged its landing gear. Thus by default the . 
special operators decided on Option C. 
After the Germans and Italians cleared a hasty runway, Captain Gerlach 
successfully landed his Fieseler Storch and prepared to escort Mussolini off the 
mountain. The exfiltration was almost as dangerous as the entire operation. The plane 
was only designed to carry two people but Skorzeny insisted on accompany Mussolini 
back to the airfield. Skorzeny's considerable extra weight combined with the thin air and 
rough land strip made it a very difficult takeoff even for a skilled pilot as Captain 
Gerlach. After a very harrowing flight, the plane landed safely at the Pratica di Mare 
Airport. From here Mussolini was immediately flown to Vienna to meet with his friend 
and benefactor Adolf Hitler. The mission was complete. 
c. ANALYSIS 
If the mission is a failure, Skorzeny, I will find myself obliged to repudiate 
you in public and state that you acted on your own initiative (McRaven, 
1995, p.176). 
- Adolf Hitler 
1. Was Operation Oak a Success? 
Strategically Operation Oak was moderately successful. While Mussolini's 
rescue did not succeed in returning Italy to the Axis has Hitler had hoped; Operation Oak 
did accomplish several things. First, rescuing Mussolini helped pro-German partisans set 
up a resistance movement in Northern Italy. These partisans were able to hold off Allied 
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advances in the region for over two years (Arquilla, 1996). Second, the operation was a 
great propaganda victory for the Gennan high command. The Gennans were losing 
ground in Russia and in Italy (the Allies had successfully invaded Europe through Sicily). 
Skorzeny's bold raid was used to bolster the morale of the weary Gennan forces and 
civilian population with a stunning victory. It sent a powerful psychological message to 
the Allies that the Germans were down but not out. The raid also publicly demonstrated 
Germany's resolve to stick by their friends and supporters in trouble (McRaven, 1995). 
Tactically, Operation Oak was highly successful by all accounts. First, the 
special operators accomplished the mission as planned. In total the mission lasted exactly 
12 minutes. That was the time it took Skorzeny and eight of his men to charged the hotel 
and rescue Mussolini. The operation was also accomplished with minimal loss of life. 
On the approach phase of the operation ten commandos were killed or wounded when 
their glider crashed into the side of the Gran Sasso Mountain. None of the approximately 
250 Italian defenders lost their lives in the operation (McRaven, 1995; Skorzeny, 1950). 
2. Was Operation Oak a Tough Test for the Theory? 
While the operation appeared straightforward from the execution it was not. In 
reality the potential for disaster was high for the special operators and yet they succeeded. 
For these reasons Operation Oak is an excellent case to test the control theory. Clearly 
the planners had to overcome numerous difficulties and uncertainties in order to 
accomplish their mission. 
First, the operation was difficult because of the sheer geographical location of the 
objective. The Albergo-Rifugio Hotel served as an excellent prison. It was located on the 
Gran Sasso Mountain at an elevation of 6300 feet. There were no roads or footpaths that 
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led up to the hotel. The only practical way to approach the objective was from a cable 
car that ran from the Aquila Valley below to up to the hotel. Guards posted at the hotel 
had a clear unobstructed view of the cable car station below as well as radio 
communication (McRaven, 1995; Skorzeny, 1950). 
Second, there was very little available information on the hotel or the grounds 
itself. Skorzeny and Radl were able to conduct only one personal reconnaissance of the 
objective from an airplane over-flight. Unfortunately the He 111 's automatic camera 
system malfunctioned. Skorezeny was forced to improvise with a hand held camera. He 
literally had to cut a hole in the canvas of the plane to take the crude photos of the 
objective. As a result the photos did not provide the level of detail or scale needed for 
such an important operation. Thus the special operators had to rely mainly on tourist's 
maps and the memory of German tourists who had visited the hotel on holiday 
(Skorzeny, 1950). 
Third, there was much uncertainty about the forces guarding Mussolini. The 
planners could only estimate how many guards there were on the objective (200-250). 
They did not know for sure how well they were armed or trained. Most importantly they 
did not know how loyal the Italians were to their mission of guarding Mussolini. At the 
time many Italians were divided on their loyalty to Mussolini. 
Finally, the special operators were working under the pressure of time. Mussolini 
had been moved from place to place since his arrest. It was unknown how long he would 
remain at the hotel before the Italians moved him again. The special operators had spent 
considerable time and effort just tracking down where Mussolini was. Thus once the 
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special operators were reasonably sure that Mussolini was being held on Gran Sasso, they 
believed they had to act quickly. 
3. Conclusion 
Operation Oak was obviously not a perfectly executed mission by any of the 
numerous accounts of the operation (McRaven, 1995; Garret, 1980; Skorzeny, 1950; 
Tanner, 1997). In fact the operators, by their own admission, made critical mistakes that 
arguably could have caused the mission to fail (Skorzeny, 1950). First, Skorzeny had 
very limited intelligence concerning the capabilities and disposition of the Italians 
guarding Mussolini. Even though the Italians were still technically allies, he had no 
guarantee they would react as lethargically and apathetically as they did. Had the Italians 
reacted more forcefully and aggressively to the sudden appearance of the operators it 
could have been a more difficult and bloody encounter for the Germans. 
Second, the planners had very sketchy information on the terrain outside the hotel 
(Garret, 1980; McRaven, 1995; Skorzeny, 1995). It was not evident from the crude 
photographs that the small pasture on the plateau was suitable for landing one glider let 
alone twelve. General Student an experience pilot himself recognized the risks of such a 
landing and ordered the pilots to abort if the landing area was unsuitable. Skorzeny was 
aware of this and by all accounts including his own, chose to ignore Student's order not 
to crash-land the gliders. He ignored the warning of General Student and his team of 
planners that they might lose 80 percent of the glider just on the landing alone because of 
the thin air. Skorzeny chided them for being overly careful. "There are some things you 
can't work out with a slide rule" (McRaven, 1995, p. 181). 
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Clearly the pressures of time, and the pressure that Hitler had place on the 
planners to succeed were big factors that led to· some of the more serious planning 
shortfalls. The Germans realized that this might be their only and best opportunit~ at 
rescuing Mussolini before he was handed over to the Allies for safekeeping (Skorzeny, 
1995). Because of these time pressures they did not conduct detailed rehearsals of any 
kind other than a "chalkboard" review of the mission with all the operators and pilots. 
Had they taken the time to actually rehearse even the highlights of the operation, they 
might have been able to flush out or alleviate many of the errors that occurred during the 
approach and assault phases of the operation. Again, despite these glaring errors the 
operation was a success. Why? 
There are several important lessons to be learned from Operation Oak. First and 
most importantly, the shaping strategies the planners applied were the fundamental 
reasons why the Germans succeeded at all. The Italians had focused their defenses on the 
cable car terminals both in the valley and on the hotel grounds. They never considered 
such an unorthodox approach and were caught completely off guard. The glider assault 
on the hotel was the impossible option that the Italians had not accounted for in the 
defense of their position on the mountain. As General Soleti colorfully observed when 
briefed about the plan to free Mussolini 
I hope that you're saying that in jest! The Duce is being held prisoner at an 
elevation of 2,000 meters, in the high mountains! You really intend to 
land there? That is impossible, my friend: that would be a really idiotic 
operation, plain suicide! A proper massacre (Skorzeny, 1995 p. 263)! 
By all accounts the Italians were completely and utterly surprise by the glider 
assault. As a result the Italians were neither physically nor mentally prepared to deal 
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with an assault from the sky. The glider option gave the special operators time to get to 
Mussolini before the guards realized what was going on. 
',;, 
Shaping also enabled the Germans to change the rules of the game to suit their 
advantage. It completely bewildered the Italians when the Germans did not fire a shot in 
anger during the entire assault. Thus the Germans were able to effectively control the 
operational environment from the time they landed to the time reinforcements arrived 
from the cable car down below. 
Second, one cannot over emphasize the skill and motivation of the individual 
operators that conducted the mission. It was a bold mission that required a tremendous 
amount of discipline as well as personal courage on the part of the operators. The 
operators were superbly trained and ably led. It is important to highlight that Skorzeny 
had excellent glider pilots at his disposal - some of the best in the world. They were the 
true unsung heroes of this operation. With little lead time and no preparation or 
rehearsals these pilots safely delivered the special operators onto a small very rocky 
landing strip in high winds. 
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IV. HEDGING 
Strange as it may seem, planners approach special operations and 
"strategic" nuclear war in much the same way, for many of the same 
reasons. The risks are extraordinary at both ends of the conflict spectrum. 
Outside help will be unavailable should operations go badly, and 
meticulously detailed planning before the event provides flexibility (Gray, 
1996, p.147). 
A. DEFINITION 
The final method of reducing uncertainty is through hedging (Courtney et aI., 
1997; Dewar et aI., 1993; Schwartz, 1991). Hedging strategies like shaping strategies 
reduces uncertainty by making the problem of unpredictability irrelevant. The planners 
accolllplished this by recognizing what they do not know (uncertainty) and then 
accounting for it. There is nothing mystical or special about hedging. It is simply a 
highly methodical approach that entails visualizing and preparing for likely events that 
could occur. As a result of accounting for uncertainty the operators are better prepared to 
control events on the ground. 
Thus hedging is planning for alternate but possible/foreseeable futures. It is like 
an insurance policy against likely failures or problems. For example, during the planning 
of Operation Thunderball the Israelis were very concerned with refueling the C130's 
once they reach Uganda. They realized the operation was not over until everyone was 
safely back in Israel. The Israelis had to resolve how to insure the rescue force could 
take off again once they landed. 
This posed a significant dilemma. While the Israelis could certainly reach Uganda 
with C-130s, getting back would be a problem. They would not have enough fuel to 
make it back to Israel given the extreme distance to the objective. There were three 
options available to the planners. First, they could refuel in the air during the return 
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flight. This however was an extremely dangerous as well as time consuming procedure. 
This option was ruled out. It would slow the operation down and make the planes 
extremely vulnerable in the air. Second, they could refuel at Entebbe once they landed. 
Like most airports, Entebbe was equipped with a fuel station in the vicinity of the 
runway. This was also dangerous as well as time consuming. What if a firefight broke 
out in the immediate vicinity of where the planes were refueling on the ground? This 
event could spell disaster. The third and best option was to refuel in a friendly country 
that was close to Uganda. Once the raid was complete the Israelis could simply land at 
another airport. The question was where to land? Kenya was the only country in Africa 
that maintained good relations with Israel. The Israelis also had many operatives there, 
and it was quite possible that an advance party could secure a place for the rescue force to 
temporarily land before returning to Israel (Raviv and Melman, 1990; Stevenson and 
Dan, 1976). Still there was no guarantee that the rescue force would be allowed to land 
in Kenya. 
Thus to insure a reasonable chance of success the Israelis opted for a hedging 
strategy that covered the two best options. The decision was made to prepare to refuel at 
both Entebbe and Kenya. An advance team was sent to Kenya ahead of time to quietly 
secure and prepare a location to land and refuel the C-130s. The Kenyan Government 
would not be informed until the operators were on the ground so as not to compromise 
the mission. The Israeli advanced team in Kenya would notify the operators at Entebbe if 
they could land in Kenya or not as soon possible through a secure communications link. 
If not the Israelis were fully prepared to refuel the planes in Entebbe. A team of Air 
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Force fuel handlers would also accompany the raiding party and prepare to fuel the 
planes at Entebbe if necessary (Betser and Rosenberg, 1996). 
Additional precautions also were taken to insure that the planes were protected on 
the ground and could safely takeoff once the raid was completed. First, a team was 
assigned to place battery powered lights on the runway in case the control tower shut the 
lights off. Second, another team was assigned to destroy the Ugandan MIGs on the 
ground to prevent a retaliatory strike in the air. Third, an element was assigned to 
provide near and far-side security of the runway from enemy ground fire and 
reinforcements. Fourth, they had also built in redundancy in the number of planes used 
for the operation. If necessary they could get both the hostages and the rescuers out with 
two planes. Finally, once in international airspace a squadron of Israeli fighter jets would 
escort/protect the planes on the return trip back to Israel (Betser an~ Rosenberg, 1996; 
Herzog, 1996; Stevenson and Dan, 1976). 
If hedging is done properly the operator is afforded greater flexibility to develop 
the situation on the ground. First, it allows the operator the ability to improvise in the 
face of adversity. Second, it provides opportunities that might not otherwise be available. 
Third, hedging provides the operators with a wider margin for error. 
For example during Operation Oak, the German planners had to resolve how to 
get Mussolini off Gran Sas~o. The planners were not certain how the Italians would react 
to the rescue since they were still allies with the Germans, or if the elements from 
Student's Paratroopers Division would be successful in securing area around the 
objective. It was too dynamic a situation to predict. It all depended on what happened 
directly after the raid. To account for this uncertainty the planners developed a simple 
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but effective hedging strategy. They planned and prepared for three possible events. The 
commander on site would make the final decision for ex-filtration based on the current 
situation (Skorzeny, 1995). The first and best option was to fly Mussolini out of the 
Aquila di Abruzzi Airport located a short distance from the base of the Gran Sasso. A 
battalion of Student's paratroopers division commanded by Major Harald Mors would 
secure the airfield just prior to the raid. Once secure, three Heinkel 111 s would land. 
One of the Heinkels would carry Mussolini and Skorzeny while the other two planes 
would serve as escorts. However if the Germans were not able to secure the airfield, they 
would resort to Option B. German paratroopers would first secure the lower cable car 
station while the raid was being executed. The operators on Gran Sasso would escort 
Mussolini down the mountain via the cable car. They would fly him out with a small 
plane that would land in a meadow located near the lower cable car station. Again if this 
proved to be too difficult the operators would switch to Option C. Option C involved 
flying Mussolini directly from the hotel on Gran Sasso with a small plane that would land 
on the plateau after the raid (Skorzeny, 1995). 
During the actual mission the special operators ended up using Option C. Option 
A (the option of choice) could not be used because the operators could not get radio 
contact with the paratroopers at the Aquila di Abruzzi airfield to confirm that it had been 
secured. Option B (the second choice) was also ruled out when the operators learned that 
the airplane that was positioned in the valley below had damaged its undercarriage while 
landing in the field. Thus by default the special operators decided on Option C. After 
the Germans and Italians cleared a hasty runway, Captain Gerlach (General Student's 
64 
personal pilot) successfully landed his Fieseler Storch and flew Mussolini off the 
mountain to safety (McRaven, 1995). 
Hedging is designed to "cover all ones bets" by developing detailed contingency 
plans that are based on likely or possible scenarios. Figure 8 illustrates this concept. 
Instead of preparing for one likely outcome, operators prepare for many possible. 
outcomes (BOX1). However, it is more than simply developing several scenarios. 
Planners make a conscious effort to avoid the inevitable problems of groupthink and over 
confidence. They critically and deliberately challenge their assumptions. They 
consciously and methodically think through where or how the plan might fail and then 
take the necessary steps to prevent it from occurring (Russo and Schoemaker, 1989). 
Hedging strategies succeed in increasing the ability of the special operators to control 
events (BOX 2). 
BOX 1 BOX 2 
Figure 8. Hedging Strategies 
The bottom line is that hedging is a continual cycle that involves developing, 
rehearsing, and revising plans to account for and mitigate events on the ground that the 
operator might face. The rest of the chapter will illustrate the concept of hedging as it 
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applies to an actual case study. No case better illustrates this than Operation Kingpin -
the attempt to rescue U.S. POW's in North Vietnam. 
B. SONTAY 
You are to let nothing, nothing interfere with the operation. Our mission 
is to rescue prisoners, not to take prisoners (Schemmer, 1976, p.192). 
- Colonel Bull Simons 
1. Situation 
In 1970 the U.S. had over 500 U.S. service members in POW camps in North 
Vietnam. Daily intelligence reports documented the horrible conditions that the men 
were subjected to, including torture, isolation, lack of medical care and adequate food. 
Reports also indicated that POWs were steadily dying in captivity. It was becoming a 
very emotional issue to the friends and families of the men held in captivity. The U.s. 
government was under tremendous pressure to resolve the situation (Manor, 1998; 
Schemmer, 1976; Vandenbrouke, 1993). 
A break finally came in the spring of 1969. Intelligence reports indicated that 
there was a previously unheard of POW camp in the vicinity ofSonTay, North Vietnam. 
The POWs at the camp had been cleverly alerting the U.S. of their presence through 
coded messages. The POWs had surreptitiously arrange their drying laundry into 
patterns that they hoped would be picked up by U.S. surveillance assets. U.S. analysts 
determined that the POWs were requesting a rescue. After months of deliberation by key 
officials in Pentagon and the White House, it was determined that the military should 
begin exploring the feasibility of conducting a rescue operation for the POWs at Son Tay. 
Planning Operation Kingpin began in earnest on 8 August 1970 (Schemmer, 1976; 
Vandenbrouke, 1993; Walker, 1994). 
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2. Planning 
As much effort went into planning and training for emergencies and 
unforeseen circumstances as was expended in the planning concept 
(Vandenbrouke, 1993, p.60). 
- Brigadier General LeRoy J. Manor 
The NCA gave Operation Kingpin the highest priority. The Secretary of Defense, 
Mr. Melvin Laird personally authorized the formation and training of the task force. The 
Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS), Admiral Thomas Moorer handpicked 
Brigadier General LeRoy 1. Manor (USAF) as the Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander for 
Operation Kingpin and Army Special Forces Colonel Arthur "Bull" Simons as his 
Deputy Director. Manor and Simons were highly respected in their communities. Both 
were meticulous planners and experience~ special operators. Most importantly they both 
had considerable personal experience in planning and conducting special operations in 
Vietnam (Schemmer, 1976; Vandenbrouke, 1993; Walker, 1994). 
The planning environment for Operation Kingpin was very unique and highly 
decentralized by U.S. standards for several reasons. First, Manor and Simons were given 
complete freedom to plan and train for the operation with virtually no "outside" 
interference. As Manor recalls, "This was the only situation in thirty-six years in the 
military where I had complete authority to plan and execute a mission with a blank 
check" (Vandenbrouke, 1993, p.57). 
While the Studies and Observation Group (SOG) in Vietnam could have carried 
out such a mission, it was determined for various security reasons that an ad-hoc 
organization would be the best way to carry out the operation (Walker, 1994). The unit 
that conducted Operation Kingpin was created and trained almost completely from 
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scratch over a period of six months (Schemmer, 1976; Vandenbrouke, 1993; Walker, 
1994). 
Second, General Manor and Colonel Simons were allowed to handpick all 
personnel that were to plan and conduct the operation. Manor recalls that he and Simon's 
first priority was to, "assemble a small group of the most dedicated and innovative 
planners available" (Manor, 1998, p. 2). To their credit Moore and Simons gathered an 
extremely talented and diverse group of operators to plan and conduct the mission. 
Manor and Simons selected nearly 26 planners to help develop Operation Kingpin over a 
period of three months. All four services, including the CIA, were involved in planning 
the operation (Manor, 1998; Schemmer, 1976; Vandenbrouke, 1993). 
For the actual operation Manor would select and train the aircrews, and Simons 
would select and train the ground operators. Simons went to Fort Bragg and put the word 
out that he was looking for volunteers for an unspecified operation. From a pool of over 
500 volunteers Simons initially selected just 100 for training. That number would later 
be narrowed down to just 56 operators. Manor was just as selective with the pilots. 
Most of the aviators had well or 4,000 hours of combat flying. Thus the majority of the 
candidates were highly experienced in combat operations in Vietnam (Garret, 1980; 
Manor, 1998). 
Third, the task force was given all available assets at their disposal. This included 
unrestricted access to the most sophisticated intelligence resources that the U.S. had 
available, including the National Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), National Reconnaissance Agency (NRA), and the Strategic Air Command 
(SAC). These intelligence-gathering agencies provided the planners with detailed and 
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accurate photos and analysis of the target area (Schemmer, 1976; Vandenbrouke, 1993). 
The planners also had the ability and authorization to task the Strategic Air Command for 
over-flights of the target with "Buffalo Hunter" Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) as 
well as SR71 Blackbird spy planes. Using this information of the target area, the CIA 
constructed an exacted replica (to scale) of the prison camp and the surrounding area at a 
cost of 60,00 dollars (Garret, 1980; Buckler, 1997). 
Finally, Manor and Simons were allowed to pick their training location. They 
selected a remote area of Eglin Air Force Base (AFB) in the panhandle of Florida. The 
exact area was known as Duke Field or Eglin Auxiliary Number 3. It was an ideal 
location. The terrain and conditions in Florida closely replicated those in Vietnam. Eglin 
was also a huge sprawling area with lots of military personnel conducting normal unit 
training. It would be easy to provide operational security. The raider's presence would 
not attract any unwanted attention. Most importantly, the raiders could easily isolate and 
train the entire rescue force without any unwanted distractions (Schemmer, 1976; 
Walker, 1994). 
The planning team headed up by Manor and Simons were extremely methodical 
in reducing the uncertainties surrounding the mission. Quite simply they left nothing to 
chance. As Manor recalls in an after action review, "Every facet of the operation [was] 
exercised [totaling] more than 170 times. Every conceivable contingency was provided 
for and exercised. Each man knew precisely what his task was under each contingency" 
(McRaven, 1995, p.326). 
The first question that the planners had to resolve was how to get to Son Tay 
undetected? This was no easy task. The North Vietnamese had developed a very 
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formidable air defense system. Son Tay was literally in the heart of this air defense 
network. It would require careful deliberate planning to fly into this hornet nest. 
To accomplish this feat the planners first developed a highly detailed snapshot of 
the target area (Son Tay) and the likelylbest approaches to the target area. With the help 
of strategic reconnaissance photos primarily supplied from SR-71 and Buffalo Hunters, a 
specially formed intelligence cell at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provided the 
Son Tay planners with a highly accurate and detailed picture of the operational area. As 
one of the planner marveled, "they located every gun barrel within 50 miles of the place" 
(Schemmer, 1976, p. 99). Based on this information the air planners were able to select a 
route that would significantly mask the raider's presence from ground surveillance radar. 
Still the planners were not convinced this would be enough. First, the North Vietnamese 
had a nasty habit of periodically moving their radar and missiles sites. What if they 
decided to move them just before the raiders launch their assault? Second, despite careful 
and meticulous route selection, the raiders would still be vulnerable to detection at certain 
points along the route. They would be physically unable to use terrain to mask their 
presence. 
In the face of unavoidable uncertainty the planners hedged to insure success. 
First, the air planners developed a clever deception plan to misdirect the Vietnamese 
radar. Naval aircraft in the Gulf of Tonkin would be used to conduct a large-scale air 
attack (a total of 59 sorties) on the cities of Haiphong and Hanoi in the east at the exact 
same time that the raiders were infiltrating from the west through Laos. Instead of 
dropping bombs the naval aircraft would drop a few flares and returned to the carrier. 
The large amount of planes flying from the east would light up the Vietnamese radar 
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systems and cause them to focus their attention in that direction instead of in the west 
(Manor, 1998; Walker, 1994). 
Second, all the pilots for the operation would be carefully chosen for their 
exceptional flying abilities in actual combat. As noted before, Manor personally 
handpicked every pilot for the mission. They were all highly skilled and experience 
pilots. Third, Manor put them through a grueling training schedule that would replicate 
as best he could the actual flying they would have to do in order to evade enemy radar. 
One of the air planners, Ben Krajlev recalls the rigorous training schedule for the 
aircrews: "Aircrew training began with night formation involving dissimilar aircraft. As 
the crews became comfortable with the phase, low level was introduced as well as 
objective area tactics, which included helicopter landings and extractions; air-drops by C-
130s of flares, firefight simulators and napalm; close air support by the A-I s. During this 
training aircrews flew over 1054 hours without so much as scraping a wing tip or rotor 
blade - most of it at night with dissimilar aircraft in low level formation while blacked 
out - a true reflection of the superb skill of each and every crew" (Manor, 1998, p.3). 
During this time the pilots developed and practiced numerous scenarios and situations 
that could arise during the actual conduct of the mission. Manor insured all the pilots 
were cross-trained in the duties and responsibilities of other pilots. Thus emergencies 
became a matter of routine procedure. A simple code word would initiate an alternate 
plan of action should anything go wrong in the air. 
Finally, the planners relied heavily on redundancy. For example it was 
determined that three HH-53 helicopters would be sufficient to conduct the operation-
the raiders used five. They would only need one C-130 to guide them through the 
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mountains - the raiders used two. It would only take two A-I aircraft for close air 
support - the raiders used five (Manor, 1998). 
The second question that the planners had to resolve was how to get the raiding 
force in and out of the prison compound quickly. This was no easy task. Intelligence 
estimates placed roughly 12,000 North Vietnamese troops in the vicinity of Son Tay. 
The specific ground threat came from five installations within ten kilometers of the 
prison compound. The closest one was only 500 yards south of the prison. It was not 
clear what this compound was used for or how many enemy troops were located there. 
Intelligence reports indicated there were approximately 45 guards located directly at the 
pris0I1. It was determined from this information that if the raiders were on the ground 
less than 30 minutes they would be able to accomplish their task without having to 
become decisively engaged with any enemy reaction forces (Schemmer, 1976; Walker, 
1994). 
The planners again relied on hedging strategies to insure success. First, the 
planners gained considerable knowledge of the enemy's capabilities, disposition and 
order of battle from national intelligence assets. Thus the planners were able to obtain a 
remarkably detailed model of the camp and the surrounding area. As one of the raiders, 
SOT Terry Buckler recalls, "The CIA had a miniature model of the Son Tay prison. We 
went in and studied it so we would know what to expect when we hit the ground. It was 
very accurate. So accurate in fact they had a little bicycle parked in the prison 
compound" (Buckler, 1997, p.5). 
Based on the highly detailed knowledge of the camp's layout it was determined 
that a smaller helicopter (the HH-3) would be able to crash land inside the compound 
72 
during the assault phase of the operation (it would be abandoned and destroyed by the 
special operators prior to ex-filtration). This would provide the critical time necessary to 
subdue the guards and rescue the POWs under 30 minute. 
Second, as noted before, the ground operators were very carefully selected. 
Colonel Simons personally handpicked all the ground operators for the mission. The 
majority of the raiders were experienced with ground combat operations in Vietnam. 
Third, Simons put the raiders through grueling, realistic training to prepare them for the 
mission. They would rehearse the ground mission over 170 times often with live 
ammunition day and night. Twice the raiders conducted complete full mission profiles 
involving all the aircraft and ground teams. During these full dress rehearsals, 
independent observers from the Joint Chiefs of Staffs (JCS) observed and critiqued the 
practice runs (Schemmer, 1976; Walker, 1994). The planners would .also inject various 
scenarios and situations in during the rehearsals. As SOT Buckler recalls, "We started 
training in the daytime, going through dry runs ... Then we began doing night training. 
There was a flare ship above us that lit up the compound. We used live ammunition the 
entire time as well. They wanted the training to be as realistic as possible. We also used 
several old building on the base and had some of our people who were not going on the 
raid act as prisoners. We would find them and take them out. Again, they included 
certain situations to add realism to the scenario. For example, when we brought the 
prisoners out to safety, one would accuse another of collaboration and want to kill him on 
the spot" (Buckler, 1997, p.4). 
Finally, the raiders were well trained for possible mishaps in the execution phase. 
The raiders were subdivided into three separate teams (Command, Assault, and Support). 
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They were cross-trained in each of the other teams missions. If a mishap occurred they 
would use code words to execute a contingency plan. For example, if plan Blue was 
called it meant the primary assault team was unable to perform their primary mission of 
rescuing the POWs. The command and support teams would then carry out preplanned 
and rehearsed responsibilities. There were also plans Red and Green which accounted for 
losing either the command or support teams. The bottom line was that the ground 
operators were ready for even the most bizarre scenarios to include how to handle 
bickering and arguments among the POW's during the rescue. These worst case scenarios 
made the unexpected almost routine (McRaven, 1995; Schemmer, 1976; Walker, 1994). 
3. Execution 
Anybody who gets in our way is going to be dead (Walker, 1994, p. 58). 
- Col. Arthur "Bull" Simons 
Operation Kingpin was finally executed on 21 November 1970. The raiders took 
off from Udom, Thailand without incident at 2300 hours local. During the flight an 
unidentified plane flew through the formation of helicopters. One of the helicopters had 
to conduct evasive maneuvers to avoid a mid-air collision. The raiders had rehearsed for 
just such an incident. The pilot automatically initiated the code word for a "lost contact". 
Each of the helicopters and planes separated to pre-planned headings and altitudes for 
one minute and the returned to the original flight plan. The formation rejoined without 
further incident. The incident was nothing more than a matter of routine for the pilots. 
The contingency training and preparation had paid off. 
As the helicopters made their final approach onto the Son Tay prison, the C-130s 
illuminated the target with a series of flares to aid the helicopters in finding their targets 
(as planned). Unfortunately the lead helicopter became momentarily confused. The 
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pilot, Major Donohue, mistook the secondary school for the prison. He began his strafing 
run when he realized his mistake and flared off before firing on the wrong target. He 
would later credit this to the numerous rehearsals they had conducted on the highly 
accurate full-scale models ofthe objective area (Schemmer, 1976; Walker, 1994). 
The helicopter carrying Colonel Simons and the rest of the support team (Apple 
1) became confused and landed at the secondary school instead of their intended location. 
Because the pilot had switched to internal communications he did not hear the warning 
from the lead helicopter (Apple 3) that he was in the wrong location. Simon's support 
teams disembarked and immediately realized their mistake. Simons calmly called for and 
got an extraction from Apple 1. Again the contingency plans and rehearsals had paid off. 
During the mishap LTC Allison, the pilot of Apple 2 immediately called for the raiders to 
switch to plan Green. This plan called for the command and control team to assume the 
mission of the support team which was now temporarily out of contact. By all accounts 
and according to after action reports conducted immediately after the mission the switch 
to plan Green and then back to the original plan went seamlessly. Again the hedging 
strategies had paid off. The rest of the operation went according to plan. 
After Apple 3 destroyed the two guard towers with the mini-guns, CPT Meadows' 
assault team conducted their controlled crash landing on the compound. It was very hard 
landing but fortunately none of the raiders were serious injured with the exception of a 
broken ankle suffered by Technical Sergeant Leroy Wright. As they piled out of the 
wreckage, Captain Meadows used his bullhorn to warn the POWs of what was going on. 
"We're Americans. This is a rescue. We're here to get you out. Keep your heads down. 
Get on the floor. We'll be in your cells in a minute" (Schemmer, 1976, p.204). 
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Meadows' assault team immediately conducted a thorough search of the compound, 
which lasted for approximately ten minutes. During that time the raiders managed to kill 
approximately 55 Vietnamese guards in and around the compound without a single 
fatality to the raiders. Unfortunately, it was discovered that that were no prisoners on the 
compound; it was a "dry hole". Outside the compound LTC Sydnor's team immediately 
secured both their own and the missing support team's assigned sectors. This included 
destroying a bridge just moments before enemy reinforcements tried to cross it. Nine 
minutes into the raid, Simons radioed Syndor to switch back to the basic plan. He would 
be landing shortly. Thirty seconds later, Simons and his support team were reinserted to 
their proper location and resumed their assigned duties to included blowing up a bridge 
just north of the Son Tay compound. Ten minutes into the raid, Simons was aware that 
Son Tay was a "dryhole". He immediately ordered the raiders ~o withdraw after 
Meadows' team conducted one more final sweep of the area to be absolutely sure no 
POWs were there. The raiders were back in the air after only 26 minutes on the ground. 
Immediately the orbiting A-Is began strafing what was left of the objective area. All the 
raiders and support planes made it safely back to their bases inside Thailand with the 
exception of one F-I05. The plane was shot down by an SA-2 while suppressing enemy 
missile sites. The crew of two safely ejected and were picked up by one of the returning 
helicopters (Manor, 1998). 
c. ANALYSIS 
1. Was Operation Kingpin a Success? 
The author would argue an emphatic yes. The strategic success of Operation 
Kingpin cannot be denied. First, the raid demonstrated U.S. resolve and commitment. 
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President Nixon had been under incredible pressure by Congress and the POW /MIA 
League of Families to "do something". The raid accomplished this goal. The NV A 
fearful of more such attacks began consolidating all the POWs into one large camp in 
Hanoi. This action in itself vastly improved the treatment and conditions of the POWs. 
International organizations such as the Red Cross could now keep better track of the 
numbers ofPOWs and their treatment. 
Second, the raid was a big moral boost for the POWs and the League of Families 
when word spread of the attempted rescue. The POWs and the families realized that the 
U.S. government had not forgotten about them and was willing to go to extreme measure 
to secure their release (Manor, 1998). Third, the raid demonstrated to the NV A that they 
were vulnerable to U.S. strikes other than strategic bombing. The U.S. was capable of 
conducting ground strikes in their own backyard. It caused the North Vietnamese to 
recall units that had previously been fighting in South Vietnam (Schemmer, 1976; 
Vandenbrouke, 1993; Walker, 1994). 
Finally, it was no great surprise that the POWs were not at Son Tay. The senior 
planners had realized from the start that the POWs might not be at the camp. Some 
intelligence reports indicated that they were there while other reports indicated that the 
POWs were not there. The senior planners elected to conduct the operation anyway 
under the chance that the POWs might be at Son Tay (Schemmer, 1976; Vandenbrouke, 
1993; Walker, 1994). 
Despite not rescuing the POWs, Operation Kingpin was also tactically a well 
planned and executed operation. First, the raiders conducted the mission with clockwork 
precision. They were on the ground less than 30 minutes (three minutes ahead of 
77 
schedule). Second, they inflicted egregious casualties on the enemy. It is estimated that 
the raiders killed between 50 to 100 NV A regulars, as well as possibly a few Chinese and 
Russian advisors in the process (Manor, 1998). Third, the raiders suffered zero 
casualties. Amazingly, only one raider received a superficial wound to his leg while 
another fractured his ankle. This was quite remarkable considering the number of raiders 
and enemy soldiers occupying the same objective. Fourth, the raiders were prepared for 
and handled all events on the ground. Everything that actually happened on the ground 
was anticipated and accounted for during the planning and preparation phases of the 
operation (Manor, 1998, Schemmer, 1976; Vandenbrouke, 1993; Walker, 1994). 
2. Was Operation Kingpin a Tough Test for the Theory? 
Operation Kingpin was an extremely complex and difficult operation to 
undertake. No such operation had ever been attempted under these conditions. First, it 
required tremendous coordination. Aside from the ground operators, the operation 
involved over 116 aircraft from seven air bases and three aircraft carriers (Manor, 1998). 
The second problem was the location of the target. The raiders were literally flying into a 
hornet's nest. Thus there would be little margin for error. The prison camp was only 30 
miles from Hanoi - one of the most densely defended air spaces in the world 
(Vandenbrouke, 1993). It was also in the vicinity of the 12th North Vietnamese Army 
(NVA) which totaled almost 12,000 seasoned combat troops (Manor, 1998). Finally, 
there was an NV A training compound that was only four hundred meters south of the 
prison compound that billeted an undetermined number of enemy soldiers and instructors. 
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3. Conclusion 
The execution of Operation Kingpin was I\ot a flawless mission by any means. 
The raiders made numerous mistakes. The lead helicopter got lost. The assault team 
initiated the raid early (on the wrong target). The support team landed on the wrong 
objective. Yet none of these seemingly critical mistakes proved catastrophic to the 
special operators. Why? 
The raiders were able to reduce and mitigate uncertainties on the ground through 
the methodical application and use of hedging strategies. Although outnumbered more 
than two to one, for a brief period of time (26 minutes) the raiders controlled the 
operational environment. The detailed contingency planning gave the raiders flexibility 
and room for great improvisation especially at the secondary school where the support 
team although in the wrong place, wrought tremendous casualties on the surprise 
Vietnamese. In recognizing and accounting for uncertainty they had succeeded in 
preparing for all the likely scenarios. The planners had correctly identified where the 
plan would fail and what to do about it if and when it occurred. Thus none of the raider's 
mistakes interrupt the flow or timing of the mission. The teams adjusted and flexed as a 
matter of routine. The enemy was forced to react to the raider's moves instead of the 
other way around. 
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v. CLOSING THOUGHTS 
A. SUMMARY 
Special operations are defined by uncertainty. It is a troublesome but inherent fact 
of life for organizations that must operate in dynamic and often chaotic environments. 
Success in this difficult and hostile environment requires the SOF planner to recognize 
and account for uncertainty during the planning process. This thesis has offered a 
decidedly non-technical solution for planning in the "fog of war" - a strategy of 
innovative thinking that employs adaptive learning, shaping, and hedging in the face of 
uncertainty. Used in combination the author has argued that these three planning 
strategies are powerful tools for helping SOF reduce uncertainty. Adaptive Learning, 
shaping and hedging enables the operator to control the operational environment for a 
brief but critical period of time at the expense of their adversaries. This control serves to 
reduce risk for the operators on the ground and subsequently increases their chances for 
successfully accomplishing their mission. 
Thus the author submits that there is no substitute for qualitative human analysis 
and creativity when it comes to the military planning and decision making. Human 
factors and human resources will continue to play a vital role in this mix. Planning in 
uncertainty is as much an art as a science. It involves planning for the unaccountable, 
unthinkable, and the unexpected. It is however a perishable skill that must be developed 
nurtured and exercised. It should not be lost in the technological shuffle or be allowed to 
atrophy. This leads to an interesting question for the future? Is the US military trying to 
tackle the problem of uncertainty with a one-dimensional approach - through technology 
alone? What are the consequences of such an approach? 
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B. REDUCING UNCERTAINTY THROUGH TECHNOLOGY 
Improvements in information and systems integration technologies will 
also significantly impact future military operations by providing decision 
makers with accurate information in a timely manner, information 
technology will improve the ability to see, prioritize, assign, and assess 
information. The fusion of all source intelligence with the fluid 
integration of sensors, platforms, command organizations and logistics 
support centers will allow a greater number of operational tasks to 
accomplished faster (Shalikashvili, 1996 p.13). 
Throughout history, military organizations have looked to technology to 
efficiently solve their problems and reduce uncertainty. The hope is that some new or 
improved piece of equipment will be the "silver bullet" that will give them the decisive 
edge in combat. The lure of relying on technology to solve problems is understandable. 
Technological advances in the last 10 years have dramatically increased the capabilities to 
collect, process, and disseminate information to soldiers on the battlefield. 
The U.S. military is at the forefront of this apparent revolution in military affairs 
(RMA). Currently and in the foreseeable future, the U.S. military is investing heavily in 
technologies and information based systems. Force XXI and WarNet are just a few 
examples of some of the current concepts and programs underway (Edwards, 1997; 
McCarthy, 1997). The ultimate goal of investing in such systems it seems is to make the 
battlefield more transparent - to reduce uncertainty through the use of technology. Most 
experts agree that this emphasis on technology and information systems is the dominant 
paradigm for how the U.S. military will conduct future conflicts (Arquilla, and Ronfeldt, 
1997; Barnaby, 1986; Edwards, 1997; Gray, 1997; McCarthy, 1997; Shalikashvili, 1996; 
Shelton, 1996). It is precisely because of this trend that the author would like to give 
pause and reflect on how the application of these technologies (to mitigate uncertainties 
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and battlefield friction) will affect the human in the loop. Are there unintended 
consequences of the availability of so much information? 
C. IMPLICATIONS 
The emergence and assimilation of new technologies have frequently 
brought about significant changes in military organization, doctrine, and 
warfighting strategy. The speed, power, and miniaturization of 
information processing components have brought greater lethality and 
precision; increased stand-off distances of command, forces and firing 
platforms and improved knowledge of the battlespace from intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissanpe (O'Neill, 1997, p. 98). 
There are two major implications that evolve out of Information Age warfare. 
The first speaks to the problem of information overload. The current RMA is about 
information dominance. It is about the increased inter-connectivity, access and 
availability of information. According to this vision, information technologies will allow 
decision makers and planners to have access to virtually unlimited amounts of 
information while denying or disrupting the opponent's ability to access information 
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997; Barnaby, 1986; McCarthy, 1997). However, the author 
submits that such unlimited information comes at a price: increased complexity and 
information overload. This can lead to the very same inherent pathologies discussed in 
chapter one (see Figures 2 and 3). 
If one accepts the current RMA theory, it stands to reason that the more 
information available (in the name of lifting the fog of battlefield uncertainty) the more 
choices and decisions leaders will have to make. Planners and decision makers will be 
deluged with hundreds, thousands, and perhaps even hundreds of thousands of possibly 
relevant facts to "help" them make timely and wise decisions. Instead of being in an 
information vacuum planners will be confronted with an information avalanche. For the 
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planner who must sort through all the "relevant" data that might or might not concern an 
operation, the analogy is like trying to take a drink of water from a fire hose. 
Some analysts believe that future wars will be so complex and dangerous that 
virtually all decision making will be done by computers (Barnaby, 1986). the author 
disagrees with this notion and believes that humans will not be left out of the planning 
and decision making loop any time soon. This begs two questions. First, is more 
information necessarily better? Second, does quantity always equate to quality? 
The author argues no. The battlefield of the future will be just as confusing, 
chaotic and unpredictable, as it was 30 years ago. In Vietnam, the U.S. military (among 
other things) tried to apply a scientific approach to a very complex problem. They tried to 
utilize America's superior technology, communications and data processing abilities to 
overwhelm and demoralize a lesser equipped and apparently inferior enemy. This 
"strategy" boiled down to a war of attrition fought with massive firepower and 
technology. Unfortunately, this template simply did not work; the U.S. focused on the 
science instead of the art of war (Cable, 1986). 
Martin Van Creveld draws a similar conclusion. He observed with considerable 
dismay how information technologies designed to make the US Army more efficient were 
perhaps the single greatest factor that contributed to the inefficiencies and troubles of the 
U.S. military in Vietnam. Technology that was intended to simplify the war made it 
exceedingly more confusing and complex (Van Creveld, 1985). 
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Complexity and specialization, organizational instability and 
centralization- these factors, to draw the· threads of the argument together, 
caused an inordinate increase in the amount of information needed to 
make any given decision at any given level, or, which comes to the same 
thing to enable any unit within the Services to carry out any given 
mission ... To put it briefly, the communications establishment made 
possible by the revolution in technology, and necessary in order to deal 
with the consequences of specialization and complexity, had itself turned 
into a major source of both specialization and complexity. The cure was 
part of the disease (Van Creveld, 1985 pp.237-239). 
The second implication deals with how Information Age technologies affect 
organization design. If the current Information Age is indeed transforming the nature of 
war, it will most certainty effect the nature of the organization that must fight these wars 
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997). The author believes that those who operate in this new 
war paradigm will be forced to adopt new organizational structures in order to efficiently 
and effectively handle the increased flow of information. 
Even with all current excitement over the combat potential of Force XXI, the 
u.S. military is currently a very traditional, centralized and hierarchical organization. 
The author argues that senior military commanders weaned in a centralized hierarchy 
environment will have a difficult time loosening up on the reigns of power, especially 
when it is now only a finger click away. Again, Vietnam serves as a cautionary tale for 
this point; it illustrates the unintended consequences information technologies can have 
on command and control systems (Van Creveld, 1985). The bottom line is that it is very 
hard for leaders to resist the temptation to over control subordinates (given increased 
monitoring ability) in situations that should require decentralized leadership, authority 
and decision making. 
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Under the conditions peculiar to the war in Vietnam, major units 
seldom had more than one of their subordinate outfits engage the 
enemy at anyone time. Ordinarily this should have permitted each 
commander to control a larger number of subordinates, thus 
leading to decentralization and a flattening out of the hierarchical 
structure; instead, it led to a very different phenomena. A hapless 
company commander engaged in a firefight in the ground was 
subjected to direct observation by the battalion commander circling 
above, . who was in tum supervised by the brigade commander 
circling a thousand or so feet higher up, who in his turn was 
monitored by the division commander in the next highest chopper, 
who might even be so unlucky as to have his own performance 
watched by the Field Force (corps) commander. With each of 
these commanders asking the men on the ground to tune in to his 
frequency and explain the situation, a heavy demand for 
information was generated that could and did interfere with the 
troops' ability to operate effectively ... That the telescopes in 
question were frequently so powerful as almost to paralyze the 
action they were supposed to monitor is in view of the 
circumstances, scarcely surprising (Van Creveld, 1985,255-256). 
Those who might argue that the US military has learned its lessons from Vietnam 
should look at what happened 30 years later in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope. 
In October 1993, Rangers and Delta commandos became involved in a desperate and 
ferocious fire fight with Somali gunmen after a U.S. raid turned sour. Through the use of 
the latest technology, U.S. Commanders that were thousands of miles away were able to 
directly observe the events on the ground. Instead of flying in helicopters, the 
commanders were linked in by live video that allowed them to monitor the battle from 
halfway around the world (Bowden, 1997; DeLong and Tuckey, 1994). 
These two vignettes emphasize the need for more than simply overlapping 
information technologies onto existing systems. The point is that it will require serious 
organizational redesign. Organizational theory tells us that the greater the uncertainty, the 
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more decentralized the organization should be in order to efficiently function in a 
dynamic environments (Galbraith, 1977; Mintzberg, 1979). 
D. ORGANIZATIONAL REDESIGN 
Every organization has the capacity to learn, but it is the speed of learning 
that separates the winners from the losers. For organizations as with 
humans and other higher life forms, the quicker the ability to learn, the 
greater the intelligence and the greater the likelihood of thriving in the 
future (Sherden, 1998, p.251). 
Organizations that are best suited for planning in dynamic environments exhibit 
similar critical behaviors, characteristics and trends that enable them to creatively plan 
(adaptive learning, shaping, and hedging) during uncertain situations. Their organizations 
are learning environments (Senge, 1990) and their leaders are multi-framed thinkers 
Russo and Schoemaker, 1989). Instead of reacting or being surprised by events, they are 
prepared. 
Learning organizations enable and equip planners with the mental tools necessary 
to overcome uncertainty These types of organizations provide an internal environment 
that helps develop multi-framed thinkers. Learning organizations empower and 
encourage their subordinates to think creatively in dynamic situations. They typically 
have less formal structures and less rigid rules. This helps foster a superior internal 
environment for confronting and addressing the problems associated with uncertainty. 
First, it helps prevent an environment of fear, zero defects and groupthink. Second, it 
improves cross communication and fosters better information sharing among senior 
leaders, peers and subordinates. Third, it frees the organization to employ less rigid and 
formulaic (cookie cutter) solutions to problems (Russo and Schoemaker, 1989). As 
James March tells us, a common problem with humans is that they do not frame problems 
87 
correctly. They are impaired by their limited background and life experiences (March, 
1994). They tend to look at a problem from a single frame of reference. Successful 
organizations develop and encourage decision makers to be multi-frame thinkers. As 
Edward Russo and Paul Schoemaker observe, "Frames have enormous power. The way 
people frame a problem greatly influences the solution they will ultimately choose. The . 
frames that people or organizations routinely use for their problems controls how they 
will react to almost everything they encounter" (Ru~so and Schoemaker, 1989). 
The bottom line is that multi-frame thinkers are able to look at problems in "odd 
and interesting ways" (Arquilla, 1997). They are innovators and visionaries. Multi-
framed thinkers develop the ability to acquire and apply knowledge in nonlinear ways. 
Because their organization fosters this type of thinking they are unafraid and uninhibited 
to look a situation from a different angle or perspective. The result is they are better 
equipped and trained to function in dynamic environments because they are able to 
correctly anticipate where plans or operations might unravel or go wrong. Thus they are 
better equipped to recognize, account for and control uncertainty and are ultimately more 
successful against a determined enemy. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Intelligent life forms more quickly and flexibly adapt to changing 
environments and learn to capitalize on new opportunities and avoid 
pitfalls. The same is true of intelligent organizations, be they corporations, 
governments or armed forces (Senge, 1990, p. 249). 
The Information Age is quickly changing how the U.S. Military must think and 
operate in future conflicts. Technology can help to mitigate uncertainty and chance in 
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war, but it not a panacea. The author argues that one cannot merely superimpose 
information technologies on the current system and expect it to be effective. 
The simple fact is technology is a tool not a strategy. Although technology will be 
instrumental in any future war or crisis, it is not a substitute for principles of sound 
strategy, tactics and leadership. If information technology is to be an effective tool for 
mitigating uncertainty, it must focus on enhancing and simplifying the overall ability of 
the human combatant to process, decide and act on information. It must blend science 
with art as prescribed by this thesis. 
89 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Arquilla, John. Address. The History of Special Operations Classroom Lecture. 
Naval Postgraduate School, 1997. 
Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt, eds. In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the 
Information Age. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997. 
Arquilla, John, ed. From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modem 
Times. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 1996. 
Barnaby, Frank. The Automated Battlefield: New York: Free Press, 1986. 
Bekker, Cajus. "Coup de Main at Eban Emael." From Troy to Entebbe: Special 
Operations in Ancient and Modem Times. ed. John Arquilla. Lanham, Maryland: 
University Press of America, Inc., 1996. 
Bell, J. Bowyer, and Barton Whaley. Cheating and Deception. New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1991. 
Ben-Porat, Yeshayahu, Eitan Haber and Zeev Schiff. Entebbe Rescue. Tel Aviv: Zmora, 
Bitan Modan Publishers, 1976. 
Betser, Moshe and Robert Rosenberg. Secret Soldier. New York: The Atlantic Monthly 
Press, 1996. 
Bowden, Mark. "Blackhawk Down. An American War Story." Philadelphia Online. 
November 16, 1997. Available http:// 
www3.phillynews.comlpackages/somalia/novI6. 
Buckler, Terry. "Operation Kingpin Raid." Vietnam Magazine. Online. MSN. June 
1998. Available thehistorynet.comlvietnamlarticles/1997. 
Burton, Richard M., and Borge Obel. Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: 
Developing Theory for Application. Norwell, Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1995. 
Cable, Larry E. Conflicts of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency 
Doctrine and the Vietnam War. New York: New York University Press, 1986. 
Carell, Paul. "The British Raid on Tobruk." From Troy to Entebbe: Special 
Operations in Ancient and Modem Times. ed. John Arquilla. Lanham, Maryland: 
University Press of America, Inc., 1996. 
91 
Courtney, Hugh, Jane Kirkland, and Patrick Viguerie. "Strategy Under Uncertainty." 
Harvard Business Review Nov-Dec 1997: 67-79. 
De Geus, Arie. "Planning as Learning." Harvard Business Review. March-April 1988: 
70-74. 
DeLong, Kent and Steven Tuckey. Mogadishu: Heroism and Tragedy. Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger, 1994. 
Dewar, James A., et al. Assumption-Based Planning: A Planning Tool for very 
Uncertain Times. Santa Monica: RAND, 1993. 
Edwards, Sean J.A. "The Threat of High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse to Force XXI." 
National Security Studies Quarterly Association. Washington D.C. : Georgetown 
University Press, Autumn 1997. 
Galbraith, J.R. Organization Design. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1977. 
Garret, Richard. The Raiders. London: David and Charles, 1980. 
Gordon, John W. The Other Desert War: British Special Forces in North Africa 1940-
1943. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987. 
Graves, Robert. "The Siege and Fall of Troy." From Troy to Entebbe: Special 
Operations in Ancient and Modem Times. ed. John Arquilla. Lanham, Maryland: 
University Press of America, Inc., 1996. 
Gray, Colin. Explorations in Strategy. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
1996. 
Gray, Chris H. Postmodem War: The New Politics of Conflict. London: The Guilford 
Press, 1997. 
Herzog, Chaim. "The War Against Terrorism: Entebbe." From Troy to Entebbe: Special 
Operations in Ancient and Modem Times. ed. John Arquilla. Lanham, Maryland: 
University Press of America, Inc., 1996. 
Hodge, BJ., William P. Anthony, and Lawrence M. Gales. Organization Theory: A 
Strategic Approach. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1996. 
Jervis, Robert. "Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence." World Politics January 
1989: 183-207. 
Katz, Samuel M. "Incident at Ansariya." Jane's Intelligence Review. January 1998. 
92 
Lawrence, Paul. "Organization and Environmental Perspective." In Andrew H. Van de 
Ven and William F. Joyce (Eds), Perspectives on Organization Design and 
Behavior (pp.31l-337) New York: Wiley, 1981. 
Lebow, Richard N. Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. 
Manor, LeRoy J. "The Son Tay Raid." Air Commandos Association. Online, MSN. 
June 1998. Available l/home.earthlink.netJ' aircommando/sontayral.htm 
March, James G. A Primer for Decision Making. New York: Free Press, 1994. 
Marshall, Robert. Storm from the East. Berkely, CA: University of Cali fomi a Press, 
1993. 
Martin, Desmond H. The Rise of Ching is Khan and his Conquest of North China. New 
York: Octagon Books, 1971. 
McCarthy James P. "Managing Battlespace Information: The Challenge of Information 
Collection, Distribution, and targeting." eds. Pfaltzgraft, et aI., Brassey's 1997. 
McCormick, Gordon H. Thesis related discussion sessions at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, January 1997. 
McRaven, William. SPEC OPS: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory 
and Practice. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995. 
Mintzberg, H. The Structure ofOnianizations. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall: 
1979. 
Mrazek, James E. The Fall of Eben Emael. Library of Congress, 1970. 
O'Neill Richard. "Integration Offensive and Defensive Information Warfare." The 
Challenge ofInformation Collection, Distribution, and Targeting." eds. 
Pfaltzgraft, et aI., Brassey's 1997. 
Owen, David L. Providence their Guide. Nashville: The Battery Press, Inc., 1981. 
Posen, Barry R. The Sources of Military Doctrine. London: Cornell University Press, 
1984. 




Russo, Edward J., and Paul J. H. Schoemaker. Decision Traps: Ten Barriers to Brilliant 
Decision-Making and How to Overcome Them. New York: Doubleday, 1989. 
Ryan, Cornelius. A Bridge Too Far. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974. 
Schemmer, Benjamin F. The Raid. New York: Avon Books, 1976. 
Schoomaker, Peter, J. Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead. Unpublished Paper 
to the U.S. Special Operations Community, January 1998. 
Schwartz, Peter. The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain 
World. New York: Doubleday, 1991. 
Senge, Peter M. The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization. 
New York: Double Day, 1990. 
Shalikashvili, John M., ed. Joint Vision 2010. Washington, D.C., 1996. 
Shelton, Henry, ed. SOF Vision 2020. Washington, D.C., 1996. 
Sheridan, William A. The Fortune Sellers: The Big Business of Buying and Selling 
Predictions. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1998. 
Skorzeny, Otto. My Commando Operations: The Memoirs of Hiders Most Daring 
Commando. Trans. David Johnston. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing Ltd., 1995. 
Skorzeny, Otto. Skorzeny's Secret Missions: War Memoirs of the Most Dangerous Man 
in Europe. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1950. 
Stevenson, William and Uri Dan. 90 Minutes at Entebbe. New York: Bantam Books 
Inc., 1976. 
Tanner, Stephen. "Skorzeny at Budapest" Great Raids in History. ed. Samuel A. 
Southworth. New York: Sarpedon, 1997. 
The Student Bible: New International Version. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing 
House, 1986. 
Urquhart, Brian. A Life in Peace and War. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987. 
Van Creveld, Martin. Command in War. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1985. 
Vandenbroucke, Lucien. Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument 
of U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
94 
Walker, Greg~ At Hurricanes Eye. New York: Ivy Books, 1994. 
95 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center ........................................................ 2 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library ..................................................................................................... 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Rd 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
3. Professor Gordon H. McCormick ................................................................................. 2 
Code CClMc 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
4. Professor Erik Jansen .................................................................................................... 1 
Code SMlEk 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
5. The Honorable H. Allen Holmes ...................................................... : ........................... 1 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for SOILIC 
The Pentagon, RM 2E258 
Washington, DC 20301-2500 
6. COL Joseph D. Rozek II .. u •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• .1 
Senior Military Assistant for SOILIC 
The Pentagon, RM 2E258 
Washington, DC 20301-2500 
7. GEN Peter J. Schoomaker ............................................................................................. 1 
Commander in Chief 
US Special Operations Command 
MacDill AFB, FL 33608-6001 
8. LT GEN William Tagney .............................................................................................. 1 
Commander 
US Army Special Operations Command 
Ft. Bragg, NC 28307-5000 
97 
9. MG Charles R. Holland ................................................................................................ 1 
Commander 
Air Force Special Operations Command 
Hurlburt Field, FL 32544 
10. Mr. Andrew Marshall .................................................................................................... 1 
Director of Net Assessment 
Office of the Secretary of Defense 
The Pentagon 
Washington, DC 20301-2500 
11. GEN (Ret) Wayne Downing ......................................................................................... 1 
4360 Penhurst Place 
Colorado Springs, CO 80906 
12. Commander, USAJFKSWCS ....................................................................................... 1 
Building D 3004 
Ft. Bragg, NC 28307 
13. USSOCOM/SOOP-SF ................................................................................................... 1 
Attn: Major Scott Moore 
7701 Tampa Point Blvd 
MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323 
14. Commander, Joint Special Operations Command ........................................................ 1 
Attn: SSO/J-2 
Attn: J-5, COL Rothstein 
P.O. Box 70239 
Ft. Bragg, NC 28307-5000 
15. US Special Operations Command ................................................................................ 1 
Attn: SORR, Captain William H. McRaven 
7701 Tampa Point Blvd 
MacDill AFB, FL 33621 
16. Commander, 1 sl Special Forces Operational Detachment-D ........................................ 1 
Ft. Bragg, NC 28307 
17. Jennifer Duncan ............................................................................................................ 4 
Center for Terrorism and Irregular Warfare 
Code (CC/Jd) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
98 
18. Library ........................................................................................................................... 1 
Army War College 
Carlisle Barracks, PAl 7013 
/ 
19. Library ........................................................................................................................... 1 
Naval War College 
Newport, RI 02840 
20. Strategic Studies Group (SSG) ..................................................................................... 1 
Naval War College 
Newport, RI 02840 
21. Department of Military Strategy ................................................................................... 1 
National War College (NWMS) 
Ft. Leslie J. McNair 
Washington, DC 20319-6111 
22. US Army Command and General Staff College ........................................................... 1 
ATTN: Library 
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900 
23. Library ........................................................................................................................... 1 
Air War College 
Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6428 
24. US Military Academy ................................................................................................... 1 
ATTN: Library 
West Point, NY 10996 
25. US Naval Academy ....................................................................................................... 1 
ATTN: Library 
Annapolis, MD 21412 
26. Maraquat Memorial Library .......................................................................................... 1 
US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center 
Rm. C287, Bldg 3915 
Ft. Bragg, NC 28307-5000 
27. Commander ................................................................................................................... 1 
Naval Special Warfare Center 
NAB Coronado 
San Diego, CA 92155 
99 
